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ABSTRACT 
WESTERNIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND TURKISH-ARAB RELATIONS 
DURING DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA 
 
Ocaklı, Sait 
 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Jeremy Salt 
 
September 2001 
 
 
 Academic studies on Turkish foreign policy claim that Turkey’s foreign policy 
objectives after the transition to a multiparty democracy indicate cleavages with the 
mono-party period.  According to these studies, while the Republican rule between 
1923-1950 refrained from intervening in Middle Eastern matters, the Democrats drew 
Turkey into adventures in the region. This thesis argues that although Turkish foreign 
policy objectives during the Democrat era seemed to indicate differences from the 
preceding era, these differences insofar as the Middle East was concerned were more of 
style than substance.  Turkey’s attitudes towards the Middle East were strongly affected 
by western objectives in the region which themselves were affected by changes in the 
world balance of power after 1945.   Turkey’s own foreign policy objectives were very 
much framed within the context of the overarching goal of adaptation to westernisation 
laid down by the founders of the republic.  The western factor therefore played a 
determining role in Turkey’s foreign policy planning. Given that the Arab world 
remained under western domination, it was therefore inevitable that relations between 
Turkey and Arab governments would be adversely affected.   
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ÖZET 
 
BATILILAŞMA, MODERNLEŞME VE DEMOKRAT PARTİ DÖNEMİ TÜRK-
ARAP İLİŞKİLERİ 
 
 
Ocaklı, Sait 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Jeremy Salt 
 
Eylül 2001 
 
 Türk Dış Politikası alanındaki akademik çalışmalar çok partili demokrasiye 
geçiş sonrası Türkiye’nin dış politika hedeflerinin tek parti döneminden 
farklılıklar gösterdiğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışmalara göre, 1923-1950 dönemi 
Cumhuriyet Partisi yönetimi Ortadoğu meselelerine karışmaktan çekinirken, 
Demokrat Partililer Türkiye’yi bölgede maceralara sürüklemiştir. Bu tez, 
Demokrat Parti dönemi Türk dış politikası hedeflerinin önceki dönemden 
farklılıklar gösteriyor olmasına rağmen, Ortadoğu’yla ilgili bu farklılıkların  özde 
değil biçimde olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu’ya bakışı 1945 
sonrası değişen güç dengelerinden etkilenen batının bölgedeki hedeflerinden 
etkilenmiştir. Türkiye’nin dış politika hedefleri Cumhuriyetin kurucuları 
tarafından konulmuş batılılaşma amacının içinde şekillenmiştir. Bunun için, batı 
etkeni Türk dış politikası planlamasında belirleyici bir rol oynamıştır. Dolayısıyla, 
Arap dünyasının batı egemenliği altında olduğu gerçeğiyle birlikte, Türkiye ve 
Arap hükümetleri arasındaki ilişkilerin olumsuz bir şekilde etkileneceği 
kaçınılmazdır. 
 vi 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The discourse of Turkish attitudes and policy objectives towards the Arab 
world requires a comprehensive analysis of the parameters that give direction to the 
formation of these attitude and policies in a historical framework. As Criss and 
Bilgin (1997) argue, an analysis of Turkey's past policies shows that Turkish foreign 
policy has always been designed so as to give priority to relations with the western 
world rather than the Middle East, and that Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East has always been considered an extension of the Western-oriented 
Turkish foreign policy. 
 
At this point, it is necessary to depict the roots of the alienation between the 
Turks and Arabs in historical context. The increasing influence of the nationalist 
tendencies in the Ottoman territory in the nineteenth century led to the awakening of 
national identity among the Turks and Arabs, despite the fact that Abdülhamit II, the 
Ottoman sultan, endeavored to impede dissolution by emphasizing these two nations 
sharing the same religious belief and claiming so called “ümmet” nationalism. Both 
Turkish and Arab intellectuals accelerated the alienation between these two peoples. 
While the Turkish elite emphasized the idea of belonging to the Turkish nation, the 
Arabs began to question Turkish administration of the territories populated by the 
Arabs and the caliphate resting in the hands of the Turkish sultans.(Mansfield, 
1985:134-160) 
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With the adoption of Turkish national ideals by the Ottoman bureaucratic 
elite, such nationalist tendencies turned into movements against the Ottoman 
monarchical regime.  At this point, the emergence of the Young Turks on the 
Ottoman political scene became a turning point in Turkish- Arab relations. After 
struggling against the autocratic policies of Abdülhamit II, the Young Turks, under 
the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), accomplished the 
re-institutionalization of a constitutional monarchy with the revolution of 1908. 
However, the military wing of the CUP organized a takeover movement (the  “Bab-ı 
Ali Baskını”) in 1913 that resulted in the completion of CUP authority and the 
relative ineffectiveness of the sultanate/caliphate in the Ottoman administration.  
 
In the course of these events, the intensification of Turkish and Arabic 
nationalist feelings and the emphasis on Turkism by the CUP government moved the 
cultural alienation between two nations to the political arena. In particular, the Arabs, 
collaborating with the British and launching major uprisings against the Ottoman 
army in the course of the First World War, brought the strained relations between 
Turks and Arabs to a new stage. To the Turks, the disastrous and painful casualties in 
the Yemen and Hijaz fronts played a heavily deterministic role in the formation of a 
negative attitude towards the Arabs in the postwar era. 
 
In this framework, after an arduous struggle for independence against the 
victorious wartime powers, the Turkish political and military elite under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk succeeded in establishing another state from 
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Like the last periods of the Ottomans, 
modernization in accordance with western standards constituted the main dynamics 
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of the Turkish republic. According to Criss and Bilgin, (1997) there emerged two 
basic foreign policy goals that became influential during the Atatürk period: to 
construct a strong, modern state that had the power to defend its territorial integrity 
and political independence, without external assistance, against external aggression; 
and to raise the Turkish state to the standards of Western civilization.   
 
To the political elite, the emphasis on the Turkish nature of the new state 
required a social structure that adopted the cultural values of modern western 
societies and differed from traditional ones in its region, and in this stance it reflected 
a different Turkish national identity. However, westernization policies in social and 
political spheres during the early republican period extended the cleavages between 
the Turkish and Arab people. Kürkçüoğlu (1972) describes this as the western factor 
in Turkish-Arab relations.  
 
Following one-party rule between 1923 and 1950, the 1950 elections resulted 
in the victory of the Democrat Party over the Republican People’s Party. One of the 
fundamental critiques of the RPP governments had been their allegedly repressive 
secularist measures and indifference to matters related to the Middle Eastern region. 
At this point, the relaxation of the secular measures in domestic politics such as a 
return to the original Arabic form of “ezan” (call to prayer) and greater emphasis on 
the Middle East in foreign policy matters raised the prospects of the Democrat Party 
opening a new era in Turkish - Arab relations. The conceptualization of 
modernization according to western standards in the understanding of the Democrat 
Party seemed to indicate significant differences from the early Republican period. 
The Democrats proposed economic development policies as the prior objective of 
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modernization in western standards and relaxed cultural and social policies of the 
one-party ruling power.  
 
Nevertheless, the western factor continued to be important in Turkish policy 
concerns. In this framework, Turkish governments after the Second World War paid 
attention to the security problems raised by Soviet policies and accelerated the 
process of drawing closer to the western world by gaining NATO membership, and 
indeed this is appropriate for the political elite in Ankara. (Yavuz,1994:246) Leffer 
(1985: 807) considers such behavior of the Turkish political elite as an attempt to 
incorporate Turkey into Europe. In relation to this point, Turkey charged itself with 
the duty of impeding the expansion of the communist threat delivered by the Soviet 
Union into the Middle East. The main objective of Turkish foreign policy focused on 
any possibilities that would bring communist ideology into the region. Therefore, the 
Turkish perception of the communist threat, embedded in the issues of both 
westernization and protection of the Turkish state, constituted the main dynamic of 
the Turkish outlook towards the Middle East in the 1950s.  In other words, in 
dealings related to the Middle East, the Turkish government acted by considering its 
alliance status with the western world against the communist bloc. 
However, the western factor in Turkish foreign policy parameters led to a 
widening of   political cleavages between the Turkish and Arabic countries even 
though the Democrat government expressed its enthusiastic views on developing 
relations with the Arabs.  Since Turkey had tied itself to a western world, which  
seemed to be the main opponent of Arab national interests and independence, the 
Arabs were unenthusiastic about Turkish support for the western proposals for an 
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alliance against the communist threat. They saw Israel,  supported by the west, as the 
main threat to their interests. (Yavuz,1994:247).  Besides this, the Turkish approach 
to problems between the Arab and western worlds aggravated Arab hostility towards 
Turkey because of Turkey’s close relations with the west.  In other words, I argue 
that although the Democrats endeavored to bring new prospects to relations with the 
Arab world, the existence of westernization as a sine qua non of Turkish state policy 
impeded them from taking a more courageous attitude in the political struggles 
between the western and Arab worlds during the 1950s. Therefore, the alienation 
between the Arab world and Turkey could not be stopped. On the contrary, it was 
widened.     
In this framework, this thesis argues that although Turkish foreign policy 
objectives during the Democrat era seemed to indicate differences from preceding 
era, these differences were not purely due to intrinsic reasons. That is, changes in 
Turkish outlook to the Middle East indicate parallelism with changes in western 
approach to the region.  
In order to structure this approach on sound ground, the following chapter 
aims at the depiction of Kemalist ideology in Turkish domestic and foreign policy 
concerns in relation to the Arab world.  At this point, the discourse focuses on 
Kemalism from two dimensions: social and political ones. That is, it is aimed at 
showing how the alienation between the Turkish and Arab world widened because of 
the western factor and efforts to construct a unique Turkish national identity within 
the framework of the Kemalist ideology. 
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The third chapter proposes an analysis of how changes in the parameters of 
modernization in accordance with western standards produced new prospects in the 
Turkish attitude towards the Arab world during the Democrat governments. In this 
framework, it is also important to raise the issue of how the strong existence of the 
western factor in the Democrat point of view continued to hold an effective place in 
shaping Turkish policy objectives towards the Middle East (though such 
westernization parameters seemed to change) and also how the apathy of Turkish 
society on foreign policy matters gave the Democrats a freer hand in their policies 
towards the Arabs. 
In the fourth chapter, the thesis aims at showing that the continuance of the 
western factor worsened political relations between Turkey and the Arab world 
during the Democrat party era. At this point, specific cases --the Palestine question, 
the Suez Canal crisis, strained relations with Syria and the coup d’état in Iraq --  
became auxiliary sources in the analysis of deepening paralyzed relations between 
Turkey and the Arab world during the 1950s.                   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
KEMALISM AND THE ARAB WORLD 
 
 
 Kemalism is a structure of economic, political and social doctrines named 
after Turkey’s founding president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His thought and policy 
objectives became the guideline of the Turkish state in its internal and foreign 
domains during the early Republican period. Under his leadership, the Turkish nation 
witnessed significant social transformations and a modern state structure was 
established, nearly all of which seemed to be very different and strange to a country 
where the majority of the population was Muslim.  Indeed, the Kemalist reforms 
aimed at bringing structural not superficial changes.(Kili, 1998:44) The main 
motivation behind such social and political transformations was to construct a nation-
state that adhered to  western standards. Atatürk clearly sets out this in the following 
words: ‘The major challenge facing us is to elevate our national life to the highest 
level of civilization and prosperity’. (Mayall, 1997:23)  In this framework, it can be 
argued that the western factor and efforts to form a unique Turkish national identity 
constituted two deterministic factors in the Turkish understanding of modernization.  
 
 Since Atatürk started the first attempts at westernization as modernization as 
a leader of a Muslim country, the relations between the young Turkish republic and 
Arab world opened a complicated new period in the region. In order to comprehend 
this, the main objective of this chapter is to examine these two dynamics of 
reformation efforts during the early Republican times and,  in relation to this point, 
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how political and social transformations in a part of the Middle Eastern region 
affected the course of Turkish-Arab relations.  
  
2.1. Westernization Versus the East 
 
 In reality, reform is not an unfamiliar concept in Turkish political life. In the 
prelude to the Turkish Republic, the Ottomans went through various reform periods, 
especially after recognizing the fact that Europeans had altered the balance of power 
to their advantage and were beginning to penetrate into Ottoman territory. Although 
there can be resemblances between these and Kemalist reforms, the latter stand far 
beyond the former in two points. In the first place, the vision of the young Republic 
was structured on a modern nation-state model that was based on sovereignty of the 
Turkish nation. Related to this matter, Atatürk (1927:351) said that: 
 The state should pursue an exclusively national policy… When I speak of 
national policy, I mean it in this sense: to work within our national boundaries 
for the real happiness and welfare of our nation and country by, above all, 
relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. 
 
On the other hand, the Ottoman reforms were aimed at protecting an existing 
political order. The main concern became holding the remaining different ethnic 
identities together under the sovereign rule of the Sublime Porte.  
 
Secondly, while the Ottoman political elite brought modern institutions into 
the country, they also allowed continuance of the former ones simultaneously, which 
resulted in a double-headed structure in the empire. However, the Republican 
reforms penetrated far deeper by challenging backward social institutions and 
traditions. Kemalist reforms involved the abolition of concepts and institutions, 
which were not in conformity with the goal and principles of Turkish modernization. 
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(Kili, 1969:40)  In these respects, Turkey became the agent of radical modernization 
in the region at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
 It is commonly agreed that positivism constitutes one of the most significant 
philosophical structural dynamic of Kemalism. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was deeply 
affected by nineteenth century positivist thinkers and by such trends as 
independence, nationalism, constitutionalism. (Sander, 1998:168)  Most importantly, 
positivist understanding shows its nature in the Kemalist approach towards social 
matters, especially religion. To Atatürk, because the western world had adopted 
positivism and an understanding of science, and had excluded values of Christianity 
from world affairs, it had become superior. (Giritli,1988:9) In this regard, the 
modernization parameters of the newly founded republic proposed jettisoning the 
religious identity that was inherited from the Ottomans and adopting secularism. 
 
 In this realm, Atatürk realized one of the most important reforms that totally 
differentiated not only the social but the political structure of the newly founded 
Turkish state from the previous: the abolition of the caliphate. Since the caliphate 
claimed a sovereign rule over the whole Muslim world, its contradiction with the 
Kemalist nation-state model was an unavoidable fact. In order to structure the vision 
of state in his mind, Atatürk perceived overthrowing this position as a requirement. 
He expressed this in the following words, which are also related to conflicts over the 
role of the caliphate among Turkish intellectuals: 
For centuries our nation was guided under the influence of these erroneous 
ideas. But what has been the result of it? Everywhere they have lost millions 
of men. “Do you know,” I asked, “how many sons of Anatolia have perished 
in the scorching deserts of Yemen? Do you know the losses we have suffered 
in holding Syria and Iraq and Egypt and in maintaining our position in 
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Africa? And do you see what has come out of it? …New Turkey, the people 
of New Turkey, have no reason to think of anything else but their own 
existence and their own welfare. (Atatürk, 1927:592)     
 
Here, Atatürk points out the fact that taking the burden of superscriptions like the 
caliphate would draw the Turkish nation into adventures and bring heavy costs in 
foreign affairs, which can be illustrated from the previous era.  
 
 The essence of Kemalist nationalism could be explained by its dedication to 
Turkish modernization. (Kili,1969:57) Therefore, it seems impossible to separate 
Atatürk’s social reforms such as transition from the Arabic to Latin script, and 
praying in the Turkish language from his positivist nation-state model. The main 
motivation for his challenge to the Islamic religion lies in the fact that the Turkish 
political elite saw this religion as a means of expanding Arab social and political 
influence over other nations. Therefore, they did not perceive Islam as an 
independent body from the Arab nation. Atatürk expressed this in the following 
words: 
Turks were already a great nation before adopting the Islamic religion. After 
adopting this religion, formation of a nation based on religion by uniting 
Arabs, Persians and Turks who believe in same religion, could not be 
successful. On contrary, it (Islam) weakened national ties, emotions and 
excitements of Turks. This result was obvious. Because, the religion that 
Mohammed founded aimed at was creation of a sentiment that claim Arab 
nationality is superior to other nationalities. This ideal was expressed by the 
word of ümmet.(religious nation) (Atatürk, 1997:14-15)      
   
 
In this framework, Kemalist reforms that are based on Turkish nationalism, 
proposed to reveal a Turkish identity, purified from the influence of the Arabic and 
Persian cultures. That is, the main aim of these reforms was to end the domination of 
foreign elements, which were believed to be the reasons for the social backwardness 
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of Turkish national culture. Webster (1939:240) expresses this in the following 
words: 
It (Turkism) is a practical program for democratizing the vernacular by 
freeing it of its slavery to the Arabic terms and grammatical forms. In general 
Turkism is an attempt to separate the principal stream of Turkish culture from 
the waters in which it became diluted and muddied as it flowed from Central 
Asia and settled in the sea of the Anatolian civilizations.            
 
 
The purification of the Turkish language constituted another focal point of 
Kemalist reforms. This reform should also be taken within the framework of efforts 
for abandoning traditional values that were under heavy Arabic and Persian influence 
and the enthusiasm for the formation of a separate national identity among the 
Anatolian people. In this regard, the Kemalist reforms pursued the simplification of 
the Turkish language in accordance with the tongue of an ordinary Turkish person. 
The peasants who formed the majority of the Turkish population spoke a much purer 
and simpler Turkish than did the educated class, who spoke a stylized Turkish 
containing many Arabic and Persian words. (Kili, 1969:51-52) As a consequence of 
this motivation, “Türk Dil Kurumu” (The Turkish Language Society), which would 
provide structural study and facilitate adoption of the purification process, was 
founded in 1926.  In the jettisoning of Arabic and Persian words and through the 
introduction of new words that conformed to the rules of Turkish grammar, this 
society played a significant role during the Atatürk period. 
 
Moreover, the positivist nationalism of Kemalist ideology furthered reforms 
in the field of education. As a first step, Atatürk ended the continuance of the double-
headed education system by abolishing the medrese (traditional religious) education 
system. In the realm of education, the medrese had scholastic characteristics, which 
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relied on “ayat” (parts of the Koran), “hadith” (the Prophets’ words and way of life) 
and the interpretations of outstanding religious scholars. (Zürcher,1993:137)  Beside 
its dogmatic structure, medrese education was given in the Arabic and Persian 
languages.  This situation led to the rise of so called scholars who do not understand 
what they read or wrote. Atatürk (1997:18) described them as “the hafizs [the 
religious title given to people who memorize the Koran] whose brains are diluted 
because of memorizing the Koran.”  From this point of view, it was necessary to 
make the educational system gain both rationalist approach and national 
characteristics by saving it from Arabic and Persian dominance.         
 
In addition to modernization in the linguistic realm, Kemalism targeted 
reforms creating consciousness of a common history among the Turkish nation in 
order to form the peculiar understanding of the national identity that indicated 
differences from Arab identity. During the Ottoman periods, the idea of the ümmet 
dominated consideration of history as an item in the curriculums of schools and as a 
branch of social science. Kili (1969:49) sets this understanding as follows: 
Because of the extreme emphasis on the religious character of the state, it was 
considered that the period, which began with the ninth century, was the most 
important in the history of the Turks as it was the period, which covered the 
conversion of the Turks to Islam and the religious leadership of the Ottoman 
sultans in the Islamic world.      
  
As a result of this understanding, Atatürk started a more comprehensive period in 
Turkish historiography. The Turkish historians began to examine the pre-Islamic 
periods of the Turkish history, which dates back to the Central Asian times, and the 
history of the ancient Anatolian civilizations. In this regard, the mentality of the 
formation of a unique Turkish national identity affected the core of these studies. 
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That is, a heavy emphasis upon the Turkish nationalism caused an ideological 
evaluation of historical findings. The national inferiority complex resulted in the 
emergence of the idea of the greatness of the Turkish nation in these studies. As an 
indicator of this fact, Republican historians claimed that the ancient nations of the 
region such as Sumerians and Akkadians, which contributed to the formation of 
world civilization, were of Turkish origin.1           
 
 The Kemalist reforms did not propose bringing a haphazard transformation of 
Turkish society into a westernized one. Instead of adopting all standards of the 
western societies, the peculiarity of the conditions in Turkey became the focal point 
in application and understanding of the reforms. From this mentality, it is possible to 
argue that westernization was not equal to modernization but was one of the essential 
measures of it in the Kemalist perspective. The problem of social development and 
adaptation to contemporary civilizations was taken in the context of westernization. 
From the analysis it can be seen that the primary drive of the Kemalist reform 
movement was the formation of a unique national identity, possessing its own values 
and excluding foreign elements -- especially Arabic and Persian. In this framework, 
Atatürk viewed other issues such as economic development from a different 
perspective. He followed a different understanding of economic development 
strategy, and indicated no obligation to purely adopt the western laissez faire 
economic system for economic development. 
  
Therefore, the westernization parameter of the early republican period can be 
described as the effort to establish new social values that conformed to western 
                                                 
1 Atatürk (1997:33) mentions Sumerian, Elam and Akadian peoples as “these Turkish communities”    
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standards. In other words, the Kemalist reforms gathered around the efforts to adopt 
the standards of western civilization, not Europe as a whole unit.  
         
2.2. Kemalist Foreign Policy 
 
 The decision-making mechanisms of Turkish foreign policy during the 
Atatürk period indicate a transcendentalist approach similar to the internal politics of 
the country. That is, communal interests were perceived as being more important 
than the individual or some segments of the society, unlike an instrumentalism that 
emphasized freedom, diversity, and plurality. (Mayall,1997:23) Indeed this 
understanding can be evaluated as the reflection of the Kemalist nation-state model 
in the realm of foreign relations. That is, halkçılık (populism), as a principle of 
Kemalism, proposed the construction of a classless society which would bring its 
share of responsibilities in relations with other states of the international system. In 
this framework, the Turkish political elite provided its vision as the highest 
institution of the foreign policy decision-making process in accordance with the 
highest communal interests. Its decisions and initiatives were regarded as being 
binding for the whole Turkish society. Therefore, foreign policy matters stayed under 
the monopoly of the president and his closest associates and an environment could 
not be developed in order to discuss the foreign policy matters either in the 
parliament or in public opinion. (Gök, 58: 1984)   
 
In this framework, the experiences and thoughts of Atatürk and his close 
friends became influential in the decision-making process of foreign relations. As a 
leading Ottoman military officer, Ataturk had fought on various fronts during the 
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First World War and had witnessed the sufferings of the Turkish people  for the sake 
of lands that  were not Turkish.  For this reason he pursued the goal of the 
establishment of a state that would be only for the Turkish nation. In his essay Nutuk 
(The Speeches), after discussing the worsening situation of the Ottoman Empire, 
Atatürk (1927:9) expressed this perspective as follows: In these circumstances, one 
solution alone is possible, namely, to create a New Turkish State, the sovereignty and 
independence of which would be unreservedly recognized.  
 
Therefore, the Turkish Republic’s foreign policy throughout the period 
between 1923 and 1938 can be characterized as cautious, realistic and generally 
aimed at the preservation of the status quo and the hard-won victory of 1923. 
(Zürcher, 1995:209) Atatürk refrained from any commitments that would place 
burdens on the young republic. Kemalist foreign policy can be evaluated as pacific. 
Kemalist foreign policy did not leave any room for idealism other than its most 
cherished goal of becoming an equal member of the Western world of nations. 
(Criss&Bilgin,1997) With regard to the idealist tendencies that supported the pursuit 
of an effective role in the Islamic and Turkic worlds Atatürk said:      
To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different 
elements equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a 
mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading 
one.  It is an unrealizable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe the various races 
existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth, 
which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during 
these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events. 
There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turanism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its 
realization on this earth. As regards the result of the ambition to organize a 
state which should be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include 
the whole of humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford 
examples of this. For us, there is no question of the lust of conquest. (Atatürk, 
1927:292) 
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At this point, the main reason for hesitation to involve any kind of outside movement 
lay in the fact that the Turkish political elite considered that Turkey was a war-torn 
country in need of internal reconstruction, which made seeking peace a necessity, as 
Criss and Bilgin (1997) argue. In other words, creating a peaceful environment in the 
country constituted a basic requirement in order to realize modernization according 
to western standards. Therefore, the westernization parameter became a basic actor in 
the pacifist formulation of Turkish foreign policy.      
 
2.3. Turkish Attitude Towards The Arabs 
 
 
There emerge two main political reasons for shallow relations between the 
Turks and Arabs. In the first place, while the Turkish Republic, as an independent 
state, entered into a period of intensive economic, political and social transformation 
period under the leadership of Atatürk, the Arab world remained under British and 
French colonial domination. In the beginning, the Turks could not directly establish 
diplomatic contacts with the Arabs. The Turkish authorities found foreign colonial 
officers as an interlocutor over disputed frontier issues. As an outcome of this 
situation, the Turkish administration confronted not the Arabs but the British in the 
Mosul issue and the French in the Alexandretta question. Therefore, the course of 
relations between the Turks and Arabs could not be established directly at state-level 
during the early 1920s.  
 
Secondly, in relation to the wartime experiences referred to earlier, the 
Turkish political elite took cautious attitude towards the Arabs. In secret documents 
of the British Foreign Office, Major Bray described Atatürk as someone who hated 
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the Arabs and regarded the Pan-Islamist programme with distaste.2 Whilst this 
foreign officer’s observation about Atatürk’s views are too rigid, it is a fact that 
Atatürk was not enthusiastic about the Arabs. 
 
2.4. Arab Attitude Towards the Turks 
        
 
The popularity of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the esteem of Turkey in the 
Islamic world were great at the beginning of 1923. (Gökalp, 1990:31) The success of 
the Turkish independence movement under the leadership of Atatürk against the 
colonialist western powers was a leading factor in the popularity of the Turks. 
However, far-reaching social and political reforms initiated by the new Republican 
government deepened alienation between the Turkish and Arab world and sowed 
confusion among the Arabs. The abolition of the caliphate became a big issue. The 
leaders of the Arab world organized several meetings among the different Arab 
communities to study the problem. However, neither at the meeting in Cairo (1925) 
of the ulema (religious authorities) of the Al-Azhar or the Mecca Congress (1926) 
convened by the Saudi king İbn Saud, or the Jerusalem Panislamist Congress (1931), 
could delegates agree on the revitalization of the caliphate. (Gökalp, 1990:33)  
 
In this atmosphere, the Arab attitude towards the Turks began to polarise 
between the opinions of conservative Muslims who wanted the continuation of the 
old traditional order and progressives who intended to establish new modern social 
                                                 
2 Major N.N.E. Bray served as a special intelligence officer to the political department of the Indian 
Office. His words about Atatürk are at the 4th page of the report, named Preliminary Report on Causes 
of Unrest.- Mesopotamia-Very Secret- 14th September 1920 26 CP/A India Office memoranda. 
(B348)    
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institutions in accordance with western standards.  In relation to this point, these two 
groups harshly challenged each other.  
 
Apart from the religious authorities, the colonial powers also tried to replace 
the positive view of the Turkish among the Arabs with a negative one. (Gökalp, 
1990:35) The suspicion that the success of the Republican movement in Turkey 
would encourage Arab resistance to colonial domination was the main motivation for 
their support for the religious authorities and endeavors to show themselves as 
protector of Islam were the main motivations for the colonial powers’ support for 
reaction against Kemalist reforms. (Gökalp,1990:37) The role of traditional Arab 
leaders became critical to the position of the colonial powers. The survival of their 
traditional rule under the tutelage of the colonial powers depended on their devotion 
to traditional values and reaction against the reform movements that aimed at 
establishing modern institutions. For these reasons, whilst it is not possible to 
consider all religious movements as collaborators of the colonial powers (for 
example, there was a great Islamic resistance against British rule over Palestine), 
both religious authorities and the local ruling elites were suspicious of secularist 
measures in Turkey. It is possible to see this negative attitude in Al-Takaddüm, a 
radical religious newspaper published in Syria.  
The people who live in Aleppo do not want the return of the Turkish rule for 
several reasons. The majority of them are Arabs and loyal to their religion. 
They do the requirements of the Islamic religion. Generally, the Muslims are 
uncomfortable with the abolition of the veil, annulment of sharia (the Islamic 
law) and the other reforms that are believed to be contrary to the Islamic 
religion. (Gökalp, 1990:65)  
 
On the other hand, progressive Arabs identified closely with the Republican 
regime in Turkey. Like the Kemalists, they were ardent nationalists who regarded 
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Turkey as a source of hope in their struggle against the colonial powers and the 
traditional ruling elite. Another similarity can be discerned from their view of 
modernization. Like the Kemalists, the nationalists in the Arab world desired modern 
social and political institutions in accordance with western standards without 
adopting all the mechanisms of the western world.  In other words, belonging not to 
Europe but to the standards of western civilization constituted the main dynamics of 
the reform thoughts of both Arabs and Turks. (Gökalp, 1990:57-69) 
 
The solution of the territorial disputes among Turkey, France, and the Great 
Britain without considering the Arab demands led to strained relations between the 
Kemalist regime and the Arab nationalists. (Gökalp, 1990:64) In this respect, whilst 
the Arab nationalists nurtured a positive attitude towards Kemalist social reforms, 
they became uncomfortable with the Republican regime because their views were not 
taken into consideration during negotiations for the determination of international 
borders between Turkey and the western powers that dominated the Arab world. 
Therefore, the alienation between Turkey and the Arab world deepened as a result of 
both international political and the social issues that divided the two.       
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CHAPTER III 
 
RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS DURING THE  
 
 
REPUBLICAN PERIOD 
 
 
Here, it is necessary to analyze the Turkish - Arab relations at the state-level 
in order to understand the Turkish attitude towards the Arabs within the framework 
of the western factor in Kemalism. In this regard, direct bilateral relations between 
the Turks and Arabs came to the fore after the second half of the 1920s by which 
time independent Arab states had begun to emerge. For this reason, here the study 
considers two instances in the Turkish-Arab relations in order to depict the role of 
the western factor: relations with Egypt and Iraq. Although these Arab states were 
considered independent, it is necessary to keep in mind that they were still under 
British domination.3                     
 
3.1 Kemalism and Relations with Egypt 
 
 
 The course of the relations with the Egyptian monarchical administration 
indicates the effect of Atatürk’s reforms on Turkish – Arab relations during the early 
republican period. Official relations at the state level between Egypt and Turkey 
began after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
                                                 
3 It was not just the king but the British who  dominated these countries. Therefore, Iraq and Egypt 
were still under the control of British, but the extend of this control continuously decreased from 
nominal independence of Egypt in 1925 Iraq in 1932, to their full independence in 1952 and 1958 
with the military takeovers. (Mansfield, 195-264:1985)    
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1925. From then on, the leaders of the two countries, Atatürk and King Fuad, gave 
several speeches based, which emphasized historical and cultural ties and stated their 
intentions to maintain progressive relations. In one of these speeches, Atatürk stated 
his attitude towards Egypt in the following words: "Turks nurture a special feeling of 
love for Egyptians. I look forward to the improvement of friendship ties between the 
two nations, who share common feelings and interests, by political relations at the 
state level. (Şimşir, 1999: 252) 
 
 However, this benevolent atmosphere could not last long. Contrary to 
speeches that accentuated parallel interests, it was a fact that the ruling powers of 
these countries represented forms of governments that were structured on quite 
opposite grounds. As underlined above, the Turkish ruling elite sought the 
establishment of a westernized sovereign nation-state and struggled against rooted 
traditional values and sympathizers of these values. While Atatürk took revolutionary 
steps in order to elevate the Turkish nation to the highest level of civilization, King 
Fuad’s conservative policies made Egypt an opponent of secular Turkey. (Şimsir, 
1999: 254)  
 
Indeed, disagreement between two countries appeared to be unavoidable, 
because Egypt represented a monarchical system that had been overthrown by 
Atatürk in Turkey. In a country where the second article of its constitution includes 
the provision that Egypt is a kingdom that is inherited from father to son among 
Mohammed Ali’s family, the declaration of a republican regime in Turkey became a 
sensitive matter. (Gökalp, 1990: 112)   
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Moreover, after the abolition of the caliphate by the Turkish parliament in 
1924, King Fuad desired to hold caliphate ardently. Egypt not only embraced 
the escaped and expelled opponents of regime in Turkey, but also allowed 
them to agitate against the Republic of Turkey and Atatürk… Secularization 
of Turkey was used for propaganda against Turkey in Egypt.  (Şimşir, 1999: 
254) 
 
Indeed, although progressive segments of Egyptian society supported many of the 
Turkish reforms, they did not welcome the abolition of the caliphate. 
(Gökalp,1990:64)  They regarded Islam as being an important element of the Arab 
nation. Hourani emphasizes this reality in the following words:  
The modernists wished to proceed up the stream of development to the point 
at which it had gone wrong, and beyond it to the primitive Islam as they 
conceived it…To return to the original purity of Islam meant in fact to move 
the center of gravity back from Turks to Arabs; if there was to be a caliph at 
all, he could only be an Arab caliph. (Hourani, 1970:267-268) 
   
According to Al-Siyasa newspaper, the question of the caliphate interested all 
Muslims and not just Arabs. (Gökalp,1990:66) With regard to reactions from the 
Arab world, Atatürk expressed the attitude of the Turkish elite in a message to the 
Arabs in the following words: "Give up dreams about unification around the 
caliphate… run after independence. The real interests of communities are to establish 
their own independent states." (Şimşir, 1999:192)    
 
In this framework, Egypt and Turkey were drawn into an era of strained 
relations. The fez or tarbush crisis revealed this fact. An angry quarrel between 
Ataturk and Hamsa Bey, the Egyptian minister at Ankara over a fez (or tarbush) 
embittered diplomatic relations between two countries. (Şimşir, 1999: 198) “During 
the celebration for proclamation of the republic in 1932, Mustafa Kemal wanted 
Abdülmalik Hamsa, who was sent by the king, to take off his fez for his comfort. 
However, the minister refused and left the place.” (Gökalp, 1990:119)  
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The event turned into a major diplomatic crisis between two countries.4 The 
Egyptian foreign ministry forwarded a note that demanded an official apology from 
the Turkish authorities. Within the content of this note, the Egyptians described what 
had happened as a regrettable incident and expressed gratitude for the notification of 
the Turkish foreign minister’s apology but demanded assurances in order to be sure 
that such cases would not be repeated in future.5 On the other hand, according to the 
Turkish foreign ministry, there was nothing that could be called an event, so Tevfık 
Rüştü Aras’ statement could not be called an apology. (Şimşir, 1999:261)        
 
On the other hand, it is certain that the Egyptian and Turkish press played a 
great role in the increase of tensions. According to the Turkish political authorities 
                                                 
4 Şimşir (1999:258,259,260) provides an account of this happening according to contrasting 
explanations of the Egyptian and Turkish foreign ministers, the British and French ambassadors by 
following words:  
As the British ambassador Sir George Clerk reported, “When Atatürk passed near the 
Egyptian ambassador, Hamsa Bey, he said tell your king, I, Mustafa Kemal, told you to take off your 
fez in this evening. Then he called a waiter. After wearing off his fez, the ambassador gave it to the 
waiter… The Egyptian ambassador sadly left the place.”  
The French ambassador, Cont de Chambrun tells, “We are at the end of dinner. Among two 
hundred guests, the fez of the Egyptian ambassador is very showily. The president ironically glanced 
at his fez without implying. My poor colleague could not aware of this. However, when the ghazi 
stand up with fascinating rhythm of the music, he passed near to the Egyptian. And during this, he 
says something to the ambassador and fondled his shoulder. As I supposed that he hugged him, but I 
saw a waiter taking his fez on a silver tray and so I was confused.”      
The Turkish foreign minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras says, “the President is accustomed to give 
special praising and pleasing speeches to ambassadors according to availability of place and time, and 
shows compliment and asks after foreign political representatives. Among the political representatives 
who visited him in their uniforms for celebration of the republic day in the Grand National Assembly 
during the daytime and also are invited to the evening banquet in their clothes, he spoke kindly to the 
Egyptian ambassador and expressed his permission for him to relax by wearing off his fez when he 
passed near to the ambassador after the dinner. After a while of hesitation, the ambassador wore off 
his fez. After that, the President kissed him.”           
The Egyptian foreign minister, Yahya Pasha tells, “After the dinner, the Ghazi definitely said 
the Egyptian ambassador to wear off his fez. The ambassador in uniform did not accept this wish, and 
after that he commanded a waiter to make the ambassador’s fez wear off. Due to the persistence of the 
President, the ambassador, Hamsa Bey, saw wearing off his fez appropriate. However, the ambassador 
who faced up this unexpected interference became really upset and leaved the place. This happened in 
front of diplomatic representatives, members of the government and other prominent guests… The 
next day, Hamsa Bey met with Tevfik Rüştü Bey. The minister tried to reflect the events as showing 
kindness and expressed his sorrow for the ambassador’s considering this event as tragic.”     
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and press, the Egyptian press and opposition groups directed public opinion against 
the Turks and as an outcome of this, the Egyptian administration came under heavy 
pressure to take serious initiatives against the Turkish state. In a newspaper article of 
Vakit, under the heading “Our publication distorted in Egypt,” the following 
statement was made:  
Supposedly, the Turkish press said the Egyptian government demanded an 
apology because of the fez issue, but we would not give one and broadcasted 
against the Egyptians. After that the Egyptian newspapers began contra-
publication and among them Al-Ahram newspaper demanded the Egyptian 
government break relations with Turkey. 6          
 
In another Turkish newspaper, Cumhuriyet, the subject was touched upon in an 
article headed, “Despite our benevolence.” According to the news from Egypt, 
Turkish newspaper comments on the issue were perceived as opposition to Egypt and 
a clamorous reaction began again.7 In addition to this, Turkish newspapers 
emphasized the wrong reflection of the Turkish attitude on the issue. To them, the 
British media the main news source of the Egyptians did not accurately report 
Turkish feelings. In the following parts of the article in Cumhuriyet, it was said that 
it was not surprising that the news that aimed at troubling the relations between 
Turkey and Egypt had come through London as before.8  
 
 In this strained atmosphere, the Turkish foreign ministry delivered a response 
to the Egyptian note. The Turkish authorities claimed that distorted reporting had led 
the Egyptian administration to fall into error. They argued that the governments of 
both the Turkish and Egyptian nations should not exaggerate this event and continue 
                                                                                                                                          
5 Italics do not belong to me. 
6 Vakit newspaper on 12th December 1932. This newspaper was published daily in the city of Istanbul.    
7 Cumhuriyet newspaper on 12th December 1932.  
8 Cumhuriyet newspaper on 12th December 1932. 
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to live in peace and mutual understanding.9 However, the Egyptians seemed 
dissatisfied with the Turkish note. The Egyptian authorities were buried in silence 
and secrecy. (Şimşir,1999:306) They found it difficult to give a response to the 
Turkish decisive attitude and explain the issue to their people. 
 
 In this environment, the Egyptian foreign ministry prepared a second note, 
which emphasized Turkey's eagerness to resume good relations between two 
countries. According to the note, the Egyptian government was pleased that the 
Turkish government had declared that each state could adopt the dress it wanted. 
(Şimşir, 1999:311)  This explanation helped closing the deal by both the Turkish and 
Egyptian sides. The Turkish government followed a progressive strategy in the 
stabilization of the relations between these two countries, and did not go over the 
issue again after the Egyptian note. 
 
 The fez (or tarbush) crisis indicated that whilst the new republican regime in 
Turkey aimed at staying outside Middle East complications, its endeavors to 
establish a modern type of social and political structure were likely to cause 
problems with traditional regimes. On the other hand, it is necessary to argue that 
contrary to the Ottoman times that purposed imperial sovereignty over the Arabs, the 
Arab nationalists who adopted modern secularism appreciated the new Turkish 
regime’s attitude for protection and improvement of its social and political reforms. 
However, conservative Arabs who supported Islamic traditions and wanted to keep 
the position of caliphate alive reacted against the Kemalist reforms. Nevertheless, it 
is a fact that nationalists among the Arabs disregarded the unifying mechanisms of 
                                                 
9 Turkish For. Min. The Turkish Note to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on 18th December 1932.   
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the Islamic religion and amongst them the legitimacy of the caliphate remained in 
question.  
 
This crisis carries importance from the point of the traditionalist reactions in 
the region to the existence of the western factor in Kemalism, but it is necessary to 
underline that the conflicting parties succeeded in concluding this event in peaceful 
diplomacy unlike the armed clashes between the Turks and Arabs during the very 
late Ottoman period.         
 
2.3.2. Relations with Iraq in the course of the Saadabad Pact 
 
 
Iraq became one of the very first countries to attain independence among the 
Arab countries. Nevertheless, it is necessary to state that its independence was 
nominal because of the continuing British political, commercial and military 
presence in Iraq. Since there existed an international boundary between Turkey and 
Iraq, the course of relations came to the fore in a much more direct way. As an 
indicator of this situation, these countries soon became involved in a border 
dispute.10 Instead of using military power, Turkey preferred to solve its problems 
related to this conflict by peaceful diplomacy. In this framework, the parties brought 
the Mosul matter to the arbitration of the League of Nations. Whilst the case was not 
settled in Turkey’s favor, the Turkish side respected the decision of the League of 
Nations. (Heper,1999:183) After Iraq became an independent country, Turkey 
                                                 
10 By border conflicts between Iraq and Turkey, it is intended to emphasize on the Mosul and Kerkük 
questions. Although, Iraq was a British protectorate and the indigenous Iraqi population could not be a 
party to the negotiations, the local authorities strongly expressed the importance of these provinces for 
Iraq, In a speech, King Faysal explains this as impossibility of the Iraqi people’s existence and well-
being without Mosul. (Ayın Tarihi, May 1926, p. 321)        
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indicated its recognition of Iraq’s sovereignty over its territory by concluding several 
treaties with Iraq.11    
 
The relations between Turkey and Iraq entered into new era with these 
countries signing a pact. Although the Turkish political elite hesitated to take the 
country into binding political relations with the countries in the region, changes in 
the conjuncture of world politics pushed them to engage more directly in the region. 
Italy’s intervention in Ethiopia disquieted the Turkish government. The Italian 
aggression seemed to be an attempt to overthrow the political geography of the 
Middle East in a way that would affect the international frontiers of the Turkish 
Republic. As a result, Turkey signed a pact with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in 
Saadabat Palace, Tehran, on 8th July 1937. (Gönlübol&Sar, 1996:107)  
 
Within the theoretical framework, this turn in Turkish foreign policy may 
seem to contradict the non-alignment vision of the Kemalist foreign policy 
objectives. In other words, the Turkish republic that preferred pacifism in order to 
concentrate on an intensive modernization process should not have undertaken such 
an involvement. However, if the essence of the treaty is taken into consideration, it 
can be seen that the provisions of the treaty served a pacifistic Turkish foreign 
policy.  In order to protect the territorial unity of the Turkish state, it was possible to 
peacefully engage in the protection of the existing borders among the countries 
against any aggressive military action. However, such an agreement in no way 
involved a military responsibility binding one of the parties to use military power for 
                                                 
11 Prelude to the Saadabat Pact, Turkey and Iraq signed four international treaties. These are: The 
Treaty on Extradition in 1932, the Treaty on Residence in 1932, the Treaty on Trade in 1932, the 
Treaty on Friendship and Neighborhood in 1936.   
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the sake of the others. The first and second articles of the agreement call for non-
interference in the domestic affairs of a party by other parties and recognition of 
existing borders between the parties. (Canatan,1996:60) In other words, this pact 
provided a guarantee for non-recognition of any changes in borders and respect for 
immunity of domestic matters. The Turkish foreign minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras12 
depicted the essence of the Saadabat pact in the following words:            
Was the pact we signed only a simple regional agreement, which is similar to 
other such agreements and aims to foster peace? This cannot be answered 
only ‘Yes.’ In addition, the pact includes a commitment for the contracting 
parties to consult and organize their actions on matters of common concern. 
Neither a reciprocal help nor a military commitment was included in the pact. 
(Gönlübol&Sar, 108:1996) 
 
By these words, the foreign minister expresses that this pact is   not directed against 
any states. (Canatan,1996:60)      
For this reason, the Saadabad Pact was a good example of how Kemalist 
foreign policy distanced itself from the Middle East. (Criss&Bilgin, 1997) That is, 
the westernization parameter in Kemalism reveals itself as an important factor in the 
nature of this treaty. In addition to this, Great Britain and France, who were 
struggling against Germany, welcomed the conclusion of this treaty. Indeed, they 
also feared that the central powers would try to alter the political geography of this 
region. For this reason, Great Britain and Turkey signed an agreement, giving ten 
million sterling credits to Turkey in 1938. (Gönlübol&Sar, 1996:119) The main 
reason behind the British behavior was obviously to break the German influence on 
Turkey. Indeed, the British were successful, and Turkey drew closer to the anti-
revisionist group. 
                                                 
12Tevfik Rüştü Aras (1883-1972) was a doctor by profession. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Against the increasing aggression of the revisionists due to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia by the German troops in 1939, Turkey, France and Great 
Britain concluded an agreement that considered non-recognition of any 
frontier changes in the case of spreading war to the Mediterranean region. 
(Gönlübol&Sar, 1996:119) 
 
This event indicated that Turkey and Great Britain supported the preservation of the 
status quo. In this framework, the Saadabad Pact can be accepted as the extension of 
cooperation between Turkey and Great Britain against the revisionist movements. 
For this reason, it is possible to argue that Turkey engaged in such a treaty with the 
eastern countries in order to indicate to the western powers its loyalty to the status 
quo. That is, the western factor became deterministic in the nature of this treaty. 
 
2.4. Kemalism During the Presidency of İsmet İnönü 
 
 
The presidency of İsmet İnönü, or “Milli Şef” (National Chief) covered the 
outbreak of the Second World War and the formation of a bipolar world. For this 
reason, the Turkish authorities shaped foreign policy objectives by considering 
developments in conjuncture. At this point, Turkey followed a neutral policy by 
staying outside the struggling military blocs. From this perspective, there seemed to 
be continuance in the discourse of Turkish foreign policy that was structured on the 
strategy of keeping the country outside any adventures in foreign domains.  
 
On the other hand, the increasing perception of a communist threat in the eyes 
of Turkish statesmen led to the emergence of two significant tendencies in foreign 
policy objectives. In the first place, Turkey began to approach the western bloc under 
the leadership of the United States in order to improve its security against the 
                                                                                                                                          
from 1923 to 1938. He wrote Ten Years in the Wake of Lausanne (Pecae Treaty in 1924) (Lozan’ın 
 30 
perception of a communist threat coming from the Soviet Union. In this framework, 
whilst there seemed to occur the beginning of a rupture with Kemalism in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, because of the increasing demands of the Soviet 
Union  the westernization factor continued to dominate Turkish foreign policy. 
Therefore, the western factor that was embedded in the factor of communist threat 
continued to determine the Turkish approach towards issues related to the Middle 
East. 
 
The Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine constituted a clear indicator of this 
situation. The Turkish government approached the Arabs during the negotiations 
about Palestine in the United Nations. During the negotiations of the UN Security 
Council about the Palestine case, Turkey supported Arab proposals for the 
independence of Palestine. 13 The positive attitude of the Turkish attitude towards the 
Arab proposal brought rapprochement with the Arabs.  
 
However, Turkey was concerned with any new formations that constituted a 
source of communist threat in the region. At this point, since Turkey (along with 
elements within the US State Department) considered that Israel might become a 
Soviet satellite, it hesitated before the establishment of the Jewish state. 
(Kürkçüoğlu,1972:31)  Two major developments changed the Turkish position 
related to the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine.  Firstly, the western countries 
especially Britain and the United States supported a Jewish state in Palestine and 
recognised it when it was established.  At this point, cleavages between the Arabs 
                                                                                                                                          
İzlerinde On Yıl, My Views (Görüşlerim) as well as three books on medicine. (Heper, 1999:183)        
13 Keesing’s, 1947: 8671  
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and Turks became unavoidable. The Palestine Reconciliation Commission that was 
supposed to bring the parties around to a solution to the problem caused the first 
serious disagreements between two nations. The UN Security Council chose France, 
Turkey and the United States for membership of the commission.14 Although the 
Arabs objected to this commission on the ground that its members were not neutral, 
the Turkish government voted for it.   As a result, Turkey entered into a parallelism 
with the west in the Middle East, and thus it began to move away from the Arab 
position. (Kürkçüoğlu, 30: 1972) 
 
Understanding the fact that the newly founded Jewish state would not become 
a new Soviet ally constituted the second reason for the split between the Arabs and 
Turks. As a consequence, the Turkish government recognized the Israeli state in 
1949. (Zürcher, 1994:247) From then on, the Turkish attitude towards the existence 
of Israel in the region changed considerably. The President expressed this rapid 
change in Turkish foreign policy in the following words: ‘We hope that this new 
state (Israel) will become an element of peace and stability in the Near East.’ 
(Öztürk, 1969:415) Hence, relations between Turkey and the Arab countries were 
strained by Turkey’s stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Zürcher, 1994:246) 
 
Apart from the Palestine issue, the inclusion of the sanjak of Alexandretta 
within Turkey led to further cleavages. The Turkish government and French colonial 
authority over Syria agreed on the annexation of Alexandretta to Turkey, ignoring 
Arab protests. The negotiations showed that the Turkish leadership did not consider 
the relations with the Arab world important, as Criss and Bilgin (1997) argue. This 
                                                 
14 Keesing’s, 1947: 9673  
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event indicates that the Kemalist foreign policy objectives did not consider the Arab 
world without taking the western factor into account. After Syria gained 
independence in 1940, the Syrian authorities expressed their non-recognition of this 
annexation. On the other hand, whilst Turkey and Syria came to an agreement that 
included Turkey not insisting on the recognition of this annexation by Syria and 
Syria not keeping the issue on agenda, Syria could not give up its claims over this 
region. This added another dimension to political tensions between Turkey and the 
Arab world.          
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DEMOCRAT PARTY RULE AND THE ARAB WORLD 
 
 
As Çağlar Keyder (1987:117) states, the 1950 nation-wide elections were a 
turning point in Turkish history. The Democrat Party won the elections and ended 
the one-party rule of the Republican People’s Party since 1923. Since this event 
became a turning point in the Turkish political life, it is unavoidable that the policy 
objectives of the new government would bring about cleavages with the preceding 
era. More specifically, the Democrat government’s conceptualization of 
westernization and modernization would indicate significant differences from those 
of the Republicans. In this framework, it was possible to anticipate that the 
Democrats would bring new approaches towards religion and the eastern world, 
especially the Arab world. However, if the socio-economic base of the support for 
the Democrats is carefully examined, it can be seen that neither popular support for 
the Democrats, nor the Democrat authorities wanted to abandon the process of 
westernization and return towards the east. (Lewis,1952:56) In addition to this, the 
powerful existence of the Republicans’ policy objectives based on modernization 
according to western standards restricted the manoeuvrability of the Democrats. 
Therefore, it seemed difficult if not impossible for the Democrats to take policy 
initiatives that lay outside the preceding framework. 
 
In order to understand the influence of these two factors in the formulation of 
the Democrat understanding of westernization, it is necessary to examine how 
alignments between the political parties and different segments of Turkish society 
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were formed in the course of the electoral process from the transition to multi-party 
system and through the 1950 elections. After that, the question is taken up of how the 
Democrats’ attitudes on the Arab world begin to develop. 
 
4.1. Popular Support For The Democrat Party 
 
 
In order to depict the attitude of the different segments of Turkish society 
towards the political parties, specifically the Republicans and Democrats, it is 
required to show how and why the Democrats were perceived as an alternative 
source of political power. Sunar (1974: 76-77) provides an overall depiction of the 
formation of the socio-political alignments in Turkey in the aftermath of the Second 
World: 
In a few urban centers Turkey was secular, positivist, and nationalist in 
outlook and commanded by civil-military bureaucrats and intelligentsia. At 
the local level, however, the notables continued to preserve religious 
authority, now reinforced by their officially sanctioned economic and 
political power. Whereas the urban centers seemed remote both in distance 
and in life style to the peasants, the notables appeared benevolent: it was the 
notables, after all, who provided them with jobs and extended them credits 
and numerous other social services. Their immediate contact with the 
government, on the other hand, was restricted to the harsh treatment of the 
conscription officer and the tax collector. Thus while the bureaucrats were 
cultural revolutionaries at the center, at the local level they appeared as the 
same old beneficiaries of the peasants’ labor.  
 
 
In this framework, the Democratic Party attracted the main opposition groups 
in the country regardless of differences of opinion and interests, and regardless of the 
fact that its program, views and mentality were not known in detail. (Karpat, 
1959:166) The newly emerged bourgeoisie and peasantry constituted the main source 
of votes for the Democrats. Their demands became a focal point in the policy 
formulations of the Democrats.  Therefore, an analysis of the voting motivations of 
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these segments of Turkish society enlightens the framework of the Democrat 
governments’ conceptualization of westernization and modernization.  
 
4.1.1. The Peasantry 
 
 
The traditional center-periphery cleavage had been a complicated issue since 
the last days of the Ottoman Empire by disaffection within the center and a 
heightened awareness of modernization or westernization. (Tachau,1984:61) In other 
words, the peasantry as the dominant element of the periphery was wary of the 
bureaucracy, which ardently aimed at modernizing the country according to western 
standards. In this rivalry between center and periphery, the peasantry constituted the 
most influential actor of the periphery against the coalition of bureaucrats and 
intellectuals at the center. Moreover, the center engaged in alliance with 
economically powerful local notables on the periphery. (Tachau,1984:64-65) By 
1950, the peasantry constituted eighty percent of the Turkish population; that is, 
approximately twenty million people. (Keyder,1987:164)   In this framework, the 
peasantry, the less educated and poorest segment of the Turkish society, engaged in 
silent resistance against the social reforms imposed by the ruling elite. Hesitation and 
antipathy of the peasantry to Republican social reforms based on secularism strained 
the relations between them and the Republican elites. For this reason, the Turkish 
agricultural society was well prepared to support any opposition movement against 
the Republicans though they took beneficial initiatives for the rural segments. For 
instance, it is ironic that when the Republicans tried to issue the Land Reform Law 
seeking  redistribution of the land to farmers, and hence benefiting  the peasantry, the 
major opposition came from Republicans who would found the Democrat Party.  
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However, the peasantry, as the most conservative part of the Turkish society, would 
support the Democrats instead of the Republicans because it had not forgotten the 
repressive secularization measures of the Republicans. (Keyder, 1987:120-121) 
 
The Democrats, who had fervently criticized the conditions of the electoral 
procedures in 1946 and had accused the Republicans of rigging the election,  did not 
consider  it an inconvenience to engage in a probable alliance with this traditional 
segment of the Turkish society.  In this respect, there emerged a psychological 
rapprochement between the Democrats and the peasantry, both of whom thought that 
the Republicans ruled unfairly.  Moreover, the Democrats’ closer contact with such a 
large part of the society might attract a large number of votes in future elections and 
hence place the ruling power in their hands. Lewis (1968,317) emphasizes this reality 
in the following words:     
If the Democrat Party relied only upon the newly emergent businessmen and 
entrepreneurs, they could not have won the elections, for these groups were 
hardly numerous enough to constitute a majority by themselves. If, on the 
other hand, they enjoyed the support of peasant masses in the hinterland, then 
they should have scored impressive majorities in the ruralized part of the 
country.  
 
4.1.2. The Newly Emerged Bourgeoisie: 
 
Since the agricultural sector constituted the main living source of the Turkish 
society and there was no sophisticated commercial and industrial sector, unlike 
western countries, the main concern of the Republican ruling power was the 
formation of a national bourgeoisie who would undertake the development of these 
sectors in the country. This mentality constituted the economic base of Kemalist 
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nationalism. The Republican government under the leadership of Şükrü Saraçoğlu15 
contributed in particular to the development of the Turkish merchant class during the 
Second World War. (Boratav, 1988:223)  
The merchant capital -both urban and rural- emerged from the war immensely 
strengthened in economic terms. Merchantile profits had risen dramatically, 
not only for the middle men of foreign trade based in the big cities, but also 
for the provincial profiteers staple agricultural commodities, as well as the 
leading figures of commercial agriculture at the local level. Both the rural and 
provincial component of merchant capital dealing with the direct producer, 
and its urban component dealing with especially with foreign trade, had 
greatly expanded by the end of the war. (Margulies&Yıldızoğlu, 1987:277) 
 
 
On the other hand, whilst these social groups enjoyed the benefits of 
economic policies towards the end of the war, and the Republican administration 
even considered their views important in the ruling power, they held a skeptical 
attitude towards the Republican administration because of its authoritarian nature.  
They did not place much trust in the monoparty regime; it was always 
possible for it to suddenly institute policies detrimental to their interests such 
as the Capital Levy (Varlık Vergisi) of 1942 and the Land Reform and 
nationalization of forested areas undertaken in July and August 1945. 
(Eroğul, 1987:108) 
  
 
For this reason, landowners and merchants indicated that continuance of a 
socio-political alliance with the Republicans depended on the reform efforts, 
including relaxation of state control on political and economic life of the country. A 
positive atmosphere for the development of liberalism and democracy combined with 
the fear of communism, led them to suppress the Republicans to realize economic 
                                                 
15 Şükrü Saraçoğlu (1887-1953) graduated from the civil service academy in 1909 and served as a 
teacher in secondary schools. During the First World War, he went to Geneva to study political 
science. After returning home, he fought the Greek army in western Anatolia. Then, he became 
representative for İzmir in the second national assembly. He became education minister (1924-1925), 
then finance minister (1927-1930), justice minister (1933-1939), and finally foreign minister (1939-
1942. During the Second World War, he was assigned as the prime minister. (Zürcher,1993:366)       
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and political liberalization. Meanwhile, the emergence of the Democrat Party by four 
ex-Republican People’s Party members16 allowed the bourgeoisie to manipulate 
between two parties to direct the future’s administration to realize the policies on 
behalf of their interests.  
 
Although landowners and merchants did not evidently support any political 
parties, they constituted a important factor for the transformation of society. In other 
words, transition from a state-controlled economy and authoritarian political 
administration to a more liberal economy and transparent rule became the focus of 
the newly emerging bourgeoisie. In this respect, both the late Republican and 
Democrat Party administrations followed policies, which would benefit this segment 
of society in return for their support in Turkish political life.    
 
4.2. Changing Values of Westernization 
 
 
In this atmosphere, the 1950 elections, which would result in the Democrats’ 
victory, were held in the country.17 From the point of view of its results, Keyder 
(1987:175) points out: 
By any measure, the Democrat Party’s accession to power in 1950 constituted 
a fundamental break in Turkish history. For the first time a popular electorate 
expressed its political choice and voted against a statist tradition several 
                                                 
16These people were Celal Bayar, deputy for Izmir and the former prime minister during the 
presidency of Atatürk; Adnan Menderes, deputy for Aydın; Fuad Köprülü, deputy for Kars and 
renowned professor of history and literature; and Refik Koraltan deputy for İçel. (EroğuI, 1991: 119)        
17 While the Democrat Party won 408 seats in the Grand National Assembly with 53.59 percent of the 
total votes, the Republican’s People Party would have 69 deputies with 39.8 percent. (Cumhuriyet on 
26th May 1950.) The disproportion between the number of the seats and percentage of votes hold by 
the parties is due to the Turkish electoral procedures based on the rule of majority.    
 
 
 
 39 
centuries old. Paternalism, control from the center and reformism from above 
were decisively rejected.   
 
Indeed, fatigue and hesitation of the rural segments because of the authoritarian rule 
of the Republicans that favored extensive state control became the main factor for the 
Democrats’ victory. In other words, the opposition, which found its expression in the 
reaction against the Republican’s ètatist economic policies and secular practices, 
gathered around the Democrats, who became the leading representatives of a liberal 
economy and respect for religion. (Sencer, 1974:221) For this reason, it is possible to 
claim that the initial reactions against the Republicans were caused by their 
authoritarian past and cleavages between themselves and traditional segments on the 
question of religion. That is, as explained in the second chapter, the Republicans 
considered traditional Islamic institutions and values in the Turkish society as the 
result of Arab influence over the Turks. However, the traditional segments did not 
see Islam as an expression of Arab superiority over other nations. Based on this 
understanding, Democrat governments regarded the relaxation of secularist measures 
as a valuable vote winning tool.  Furthermore, Turkish society did not perceive Islam 
as a means of Arab domination over other nations or an element for further political 
and social unification with Arabs as Lewis argues (1952:56), and the fact that foreign 
affairs was a part of governmental policy, which should be considered above the 
interests of contending political parties and social classes as Gök (1984:58) claims, 
the Democrats indicated a much more independent approach towards the Arab world 
in terms of internal politics. In other words, while traditional segments desired 
relaxation of secularist measures, they were not enthusiastic for rapprochement with 
the Arabs.   
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On the other hand, the Democrats’ attitude towards Islam and Muslim 
movements developed under the influence of the domestic conditions of the country. 
In other words, they became more tolerant of religious demands. In this respect, the 
Democrats' mentality of westernization and modernization began to indicate serious 
cleavages with its predecessor. Unlike the periods of Atatürk and İnönü, the 
government headed by Adnan Menderes gave less emphasis to the westernization 
reforms.  Indeed, by abandoning some significant reforms the Democrat government 
moved away from the path of modernisation followed by the previous government.  
It considered secularist measures as being against the freedom of conscience. It 
adopted the legal and historical approach to religious freedom by considering it a part 
of the basic liberties. (Karpat, 1959:278-279) 
 
As an indicator of this situation, just after taking government, the Democrat 
government presented a proposal for returning to the original Arabic form of ezan 
(call to prayer).18  
In the following days, the Parliament, which was dominated by the Democrat 
deputies, decided on the abolishment of the prohibition for ezan in Arabic and 
the parliamentary debates on this matter made the people who gathered outside 
the Assembly building listen to broadcasting.19     
 
In this way, the Democrats sent their first message to the traditional segments of the 
society who had voted for them.    
 
Subsequently the Democrat government continued to destroy the institutional 
structure of secularist policies. Obligatory courses on religious matters were brought 
                                                 
18 Cumhuriyet on 15th June 1950. 
19 Cumhuriyet on 18th June 1950. 
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into the curricula of the primary schools.20 In addition to this, the Kemalist reforms 
on the language issue became a target for the Democrat deputies.  
During the discussions about the reforms of the Turkish language in the 
Assembly, Gazi Yiğitbaş, one of the prominent deputies of the Democrat 
Party, blamed the prior Republican administration for destroying the Turkish 
language, and he insulted the Republicans by saying that one might suspect 
the people who did such things for their blood and nationality.21   
 
On the other hand, the chaotic relations between the Democrats and 
Republicans entered a new controversial era because of the regressive attitude of the 
Democrats towards the social reforms that were realized by their predecessors. The 
Republicans saw that bringing a moderate approach towards the conservative 
segments of the society would not break the ties between them and the Democrats. It 
seemed impossible that the Republicans could change the voting preference of the 
traditional rural segments in time for the next elections. For this reason, the 
Republicans changed their strategy against the Democrats and began to claim that the 
Democrats were tolerating reactionary challenges to the Kemalist reforms. One of 
the most famous instances of opposition to the Kemalist reforms happened in Konya 
during a regional meeting of the Democrat Party. Some of its supporters demanded a 
return to the traditional clothes like the fez, kara çarşaf (veiled dress) and the Arabic 
alphabet.22 According to the party authorities such kind of demands came from the 
villagers who had recently joined the party membership.  This situation irritated the 
Democrats, especially Adnan Menderes,  the head of both the government and party. 
Against the accusations by the Republicans, he remarked:  
                                                 
20 Cumhuriyet on 21st October 1950. 
21 Cumhuriyet on 16th November 1950. 
22 Cumhuriyet on 13th March 1951.    
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The Republicans misused the issue of religious fundamentalism by 
proclaiming themselves as the protector of the Kemalist reforms. They want 
to say that it is possible that religious fundamentalism is spreading over the 
whole country. That is, a small number of fundamentalist people can be 
capable of using religion for political aims by making the Turkish nation 
follow them. The Turkish nation is the only real protector of the Kemalist 
reforms.23      
 
During student protests against fundamentalist publications, especially Necip 
Fazıl Kısakürek’s24 Büyük Doğu (The Great East), the Ministry of Interior Affairs 
claimed that there were no religious fundamentalist movements in the country.25 
Menderes subsequently stated that the Democrat Party had proclaimed its compliance 
with the principle of freedom of expression five years previously.26  Under this 
heading it included statements on the free expression of religious belief. 
  
This did not mean that the Democrats were prepared to tolerate religious 
fundamentalism when it did emerge.  In June 1951, for example, the government 
launched an all-out effort to round up and detain the Tijanis, a religious order that 
was vandalizing statues of Atatürk and campaigning for a theocratic monarchy. 
(Ahmad, 1977:367) Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was sentenced to prison because of his 
anti-secular writings. (Eroğul, 1970:81) In addition, the Assembly issued the Atatürk 
Bill, which aimed at the protection of the Kemalist reforms and Atatürk’s busts from 
                                                 
23 Cumhuriyet on 18th March 1951 
24 Fecip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983) is one of the famous Turkish poets, playwrights and journalists. 
He was the leading exponent of mysticism and Islamic nationalism in contemporary Turkey. He 
applied the forms of nineteenth century French poetry to national themes. With a rare matery of meter, 
he displayed deep psychological insights. His Islamic writings include Martyrs for Religion In Recent 
Times (Son Devrin Din Mazlumları), Caliph Ali: The Gate to the Land of Wisdom (İlim Beldesinin 
Kapısı: Hazret-i Ali), From the Pilgrimage (Haçdan), 1001 Sayings of the Prophet (Binbir Hadis), and 
The Divine Light that Descended on the Desert (Çöle İnen Nur) (Heper: 1999:234)      
25 Cumhuriyet on 23rd March 1951      
26 Cumhuriyet on 24th March 1951 
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the violent attacks of the religious fundamentalists.27 This also granted the 
government greater powers to deal with those who contested Kemalism. (Ahmad, 
1977:367) By this maneuver, the Democrats seized the opportunity to prevent the 
Republicans from proclaiming themselves as the real and unique protector of the 
Kemalist reforms in the country.  
 
Although the relations between two parties began to ease after an attack on 
Ahmet Emin Yalman28 by the religious fundamentalists29, the political rivalry drew 
the Democrat government to become much more aggressive against the Republicans 
and their principles.  During the peaceful era between two parties, Adnan Menderes 
had praised conscience, common sense and patriotism of the Republicans and 
suggested cooperation with them against religious reactionaries who are the enemies 
of freedom.30  
 
However, in the atmosphere of the 1954 elections the political rivalry 
between two parties revived. In this context the Democrats demonstrated their 
willingness to politicize Islam when they accepted the support of the Nurcus, one of 
the most powerful religious groups in the country. (Sarıbay,124:1991) They began to 
hold the most prestigious position in the Turkish society in parallel to the toleration 
                                                 
27 Cumhuriyet on 26th July 1951  
28 Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1973)from a dönme (crypto-Jewish) family of Salonica. He is 
graduated from Columbia University and gave lectures in sociology and statistics in Istabul (1914-
1920). After returning to Turkey from deportation to Malta, he founded the newspaper Vatan 
(Fatherland) in 1923, introducing a more modern American-inspired style of journalism.  When he 
was arrested in 1925, his newspaper was closed down. After that, he entered business life as an 
importer of American cars and tractors. In 1940, Yalman reopened Vatan. After the 1946 elections, he 
supported the Democrat Party. In 1952, he narrowly escaped an attempt on his life by fundamentalists. 
In the later 1950s, he turned against Menderes and sentenced to fifteen months in 1959. His 
publishing career ended in 1962. (Zürcher, 370:1993) The religious fundamentalists chose him as a 
target because of his being Jewish and mason. (Yalman,1970:278) 
29 Cumhuriyet on 26th July 1951 
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of the Democrat government of their religious movement. (Mardin,1969:367) During 
this period, the Democrats tolerated the development of the Nurcu movements 
because of their exploitation policies of religious matters for electoral reasons. 
(Kaçmazoğlu, 1998:75) The Democrats’ attitude towards Said Nursi31, the leader of 
the Nurcu movement is an example of this attitude. Placed under strict governmental 
surveillance because of his suspicious religious speeches and movements during the 
early Republican era, the Democrats did not continue such an attitude against him. 
On contrary, he became a respected figure in their eyes.  
As an indicator of this situation, some of the cabinet members visited Said 
Nursi in Emirdağ (a district of Ankara province), and when Adnan Menderes 
came to this town, the followers of the Nurcu movement welcomed him with 
green flags and after that Said Nursi began his free voyages in the country. 
(Tunaya,124:1991)  
 
The more the Democrats became associated with the Islamists, the more it was 
regarded as part of the peripheral religious movement opposed to the centralizing and 
secularizing bureaucracy. (Sarıbay,1991:124) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
30 Zafer on 28th December 1952 
31 Said Nursi (1876-1960) was born as son of a poor cleric of Kurdish extraction in Nurs, province of 
Bitlis. He had a traditional religious education and became an active member of the Nakşibendi 
dervish order. During his being in Istanbul, he had on good terms with the Young Turks, but after 
revolution joined the fundamentalist Muhammadan Union. After the counter-revolution of April 1909 
he lived in the east for some years, but in 1911 he returned to Istanbul and seems to have entered the 
entourage of Sultan Mehmet V. During the First World War, he served with the Special Organization 
as a propagandist. During the clashes against the Russians on the Caucassian front, he was taken as a 
prisoner of war by Russians. After the war, he returned and joined the Society for the Elavation of 
Kurdistan. In the course of the Liberation War, he joined the Turkish nationalists, but broke with them 
in January 1923 over their secularist course. After the Kurdish insurrection of 1925, he was arrested 
and deported first to a village near Isparta and then to Eskişehir (1935), Kastamonu (1936), Denizli 
(1943) and Emirdağ, near Afyon (1944). When the Democrat Party came to power in 1950, he was 
released, but arrested and tried many times for alleged political use of religion. He expounded his 
ideas in a number of tracts collectively known as Risale-i Nur (Message of Light), which really 
revolved around a kind of Islamic moral rearmament coupled with the adoption of Western 
technology and science. His movement known as Nurculuk acquired a large following in Turkey, 
which is still growing today. (Zürcher, 1993:366)      
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Moreover, personal initiatives of the Democrat deputies also came to the fore 
in the name of the protection of religious matters: 
In 1958, a number of deputies under the leadership of Münip Hayri Ürgüplü, 
deputy for Nevşehir, wanted to take Islam and prophet Mohammed under the 
protection of the Punishment Law by proposing a law, which aimed at the 
punishment for attacks on Islam. It would have been called the Law for the 
Protection of Sacred Things (Mukadessatı Koruma Kanunu). However, after 
serious debate and criticism, these deputies withdrew the proposal. They 
intended to table it again again, but ultimately did not reintroduce it into the 
Assembly. (Tunaya, 210:1991) 
 
 
These events indicate that pressure from traditional segments of the Turkish 
society led to the abandonment of the secularist measures by the Democrats.  Besides 
this, the demands of the traditional segments on the religious matters cannot be 
directly related to pan-Arabism. Indeed, their main motivation in their struggle 
against the Republican authority was the rivalry between periphery and center. That 
is, these movements reacted against oppressive policies against their traditional 
background of which Islam constituted one of the basic elements. Even the Tijanis 
were not specifically pan-Muslim or pro-Arab or pro-Iranian and there is no valid 
evidence that the Tijanis had contacts outside Turkey. (Lewis, 1952: 56) Their 
conceptualization of political liberalism consisted of the relaxation of state controls 
on religious matters. 
  
Therefore, it seems impossible to argue that there occurred pressures from the 
popular support of the Democrats for the establishment of smoother relations 
between Turkey and the Arab world.  Indeed, while the Democrats relaxed many of 
the social reforms imposed by the previous Republican administration, increasing 
demands for widening the area of the public discussion of religious matters made 
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some of the Democrat authorities uncomfortable.  For instance, during the Congress 
of the Democrat Party in Manisa, some delegates demanded a widening of religious 
education.32 Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu33, one of top Democrat authorities, 
expressed the necessity of being conscious of the fact that the people in this country 
were Muslim as well as Turk. 34  The fact that the Democrats gave concessions for 
the traditional segments on the religious matters meant votes for the next elections. 
The relaxation of the secularist measures cannot be perceived as being aimed at 
ending the alienation between Turkey and the Arab world.  
 
However, whilst the Democrats seemed to abandon westernization in the 
social realm, demands from Turkish society for the relaxation of state control in 
economic life and introduction of more liberal measures led the Democrats to pursue 
pro-western policies. In other words, the westernization parameters of the Turkish 
governments shifted from the social to the economic realm. This situation did not 
weaken the influence of the western factor in the Turkish policy objectives.                       
   
 
 
                                                 
32 Cumhuriyet 18th May 1951 
33 Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu (1900- ) was one of the most important personal figures in the Turkish 
political life. After graduation from Halkalı Agriculture Institute, he began wright career in Dergah 
magazine. He was tried in Elazığ İstiklal Courts because of his writings that supported Terakkiperver 
Party in 1925 but he was released.  After the transition to multiparty system, he took place in the 
Democrat Party organization. In the 1950 election he was elected as the Democrat deputy for Manisa. 
In the first Menderes cabinet, he became the state minister for the use of the Marshall Aid. Then he 
was dutied as the interior affairs minister in the following Menderes government. However, he 
resigned from the Democrat Party because of disagreements on the rights of press. After that, he 
founded Hürriyet (Freedom) Partyin 1955. However, after the closure of his party in 1958, he joined 
to the Republican People’s Party. During the aftermath of the 1960 coup, he became a member of the 
founding assembly and resigned this duty after the completein of the misson of the Founding 
Assembly. (Meydan Larousse, V-6, 1979: )            
34 Cumhuriyet 19th May 1951 
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4.3. The Democrat Attitude Towards The Arabs 
 
As it is shown above, the Democrats took a positive approach towards Islam 
in order to illustrate their difference from the preceding mono-party rule of the 
Republican People’s Party.  The Democrats indicated a similar approach in the 
matter of relations with the Arab world. During the opposition years and the first 
years of the ruling power, they criticized the negative and hesitant attitude of the 
Republicans towards the Arabs and underlined that this situation would be reversed 
during their rule. Fuat Köprülü35, the foreign minister of the Democrat government 
explains the main lines of his government’s policy towards the Arab world as 
follows36:  
I felt that Turkey should have smoothened the relations with the Arab world 
since the establishment of the first Democrat government. The Republicans 
were not interested in them because of their being weak and disunited, and 
thought that Turkey would not gain but would lose in the case of any kind of 
relations with them. In my opinion, İnönü does not like the Arabs because of 
his experiences during the First World War. Among the duties of a foreign 
minister, one of the basic matters is to give guarantees of friendship with 
neighboring countries. Honesty is not sufficient by oneself, it is also 
necessary to be a friend that would never bring any suspicion. I behaved 
honestly and sincerely towards the Arabs, and I think that the Arabs 
appreciated this. 
 
On the other hand, from the perspective of international politics, the attitude 
of the Democrat governments towards the Arabs cannot be separated from the 
                                                 
35 Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966) descended from the famous family of grand viziers who ruled the 
Ottoman Empire during the second half of the seventeenth century. He studied law, but left the 
university without graduating. Then, he studied literature, history and philosophy privately. He 
struggled to establish European scholarly standards in the study of literature and history, and became 
one of the founders of Turkology Institute in Turkey in 1924. While emphasizing the continuity 
between older Central Asian cultures and the Ottoman-Turkish one, he opposed the more extreme 
nationalist historical thesis. In 1934, he was entered politics when he was elected to the assembly. 
Apart from being one of the founders of the Democrat Party, he served as the foreign minister of the 
first Menderes government after 1950. However, he resigned from the Democrat Party in 1957. His 
efforts to reenter politics after the 1960 coup failed. (Zürcher, 1993:360)          
36 State Department Decimal File, Number 782 00/6-151, NARA, Washington DC  
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Republican times.  That is, the Democrats – like the Republicans -- considered 
matters related to the Middle East within the context of relations with the west. The 
question of NATO membership, which arose during the Republican rule, continued 
to be one of the main considerations of the Democrats. From then on, the Turkish 
policy objectives began to indicate greater parallelism with those of the western 
world. The foreign minister, Fuat Köprülü, emphasized this in the following way:  
Our national interests are the same as the political and military objectives of 
NATO.37 After the realization of the full membership to the NATO by the first 
Democrat government, the influence of the western factor strengthened in the 
Turkish policy objectives. Hence, Turkey’s relations with Arab countries were 
shaped according to its obligations to the western world. (McGhee,1990:206) 
 
In this framework, westernization that constituted the main cornerstone of 
Kemalist policy objectives continued to be the main factor in the Democrats’ efforts 
to establish closer ties with the Arab world.  They tried to impose the Turkish foreign 
policy parameters on the Arabs but their options were limited because of their 
commitment to westernization as the ultimate goal of the Turkish state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Ayın Tarihi, October 1951, p.18 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
TURKISH-ARAB RELATIONS DURING THE DEMOCRAT PERIOD 
 
 
 As explained above, popular support for the Democrats could not constitute a 
propulsive factor in their policy objectives towards the Arabs. Indeed, political 
rivalry in this moderate two-party system, formed by the Democrats as the ruling 
power and the Republicans as the opposition, did not extend to foreign policy 
matters. (Gök, 1984:58) Moreover, like the Republicans, the Democrats considered 
the military and political inclusion of Turkey in the western bloc as being necessary 
for the struggle against the strengthening regional influence of the USSR. It is 
possible to claim that the Turkish ruling elites used the Soviet threat as a means of 
approaching to west. (Yavuz,1994:244)  Apart from the political dimension, the fact 
that Turkey wanted to benefit from American aid programs in the aftermath of WWII 
can constitute a reason for Turkey’s insistence on the Soviet threat. Indeed, all of the 
Turkish governments emphasized that not only Europe but also the Middle East lay 
under the Soviet threat after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. (Yavuz, 
1994:94)  Accordingly Turkey welcomed western involvement in the Middle East for 
the reason that it would benefit from western development aid in return for providing 
a stronghold for the west in the Middle East.  
 
 In this regard, free from any critics in Turkish political arena, the Democrats 
accelerated the process of westernization in the political realm. Full membership to 
NATO in 1952 constituted the first major step in this process. As  Britain remained 
the key western player in the region just after the war, Turkey’s involvement in 
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regional affairs took place under the aegis of the British. (Sever, 1990:144) Turkey 
subsequently became involved in several endeavors to establish regional military 
organizations in collaboration with its western allies. However, by voluntary 
leadership of such untimely projects as the Middle East Defense Organization or the 
Baghdad Pact, it seemed to ease the burden of those western nations bent on 
continuing their exploitation of the Middle East. (Ataöv,1970:126)  It is a fact that 
the security concerns of the Arabs were not the same as the concerns of the Turks. 
While Turkey tried to gather the Middle Eastern countries into security alliances 
directed against the Soviets, the Arabs preferred to remain neutral in the Cold War 
game. They did not regard  the USSR as a threat and were more concerned with 
driving the imperialist powers from the region. Their concerns reached a peak with 
the rise of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser. In this context, the Arabs 
did not welcome Turkish and western plans concerning the region. Therefore, the 
Turkish ruling circles suffered prestige especially in the eyes of the Arabs as the 
collaborator of Western imperialism. (Ataöv, 1970:126) 
 
Besides this, by taking side with the western countries in political and 
military problems Turkey damaged its standing in Arab eyes. In order to point out 
this, the chapter analyzes four major problems: the Palestine Question; the Suez 
Canal Crisis; strained relations between Turkey and Syria; and the military takeover 
in Iraq.  Each of these matters indicates that although the Democrats claimed to open 
a new era in the Turkish-Arab relations, the western factor continued to be the main 
determinant in Turkish foreign policy objectives.  
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 5.1. The Palestine Question 
 
 After the recognition of Israel in 1949, relations between Israel and Turkey 
became the focal point of Arab criticisms of Turkey. Realizing the fact that the new 
Israeli state would be pro-western instead of being a satellite state of the Soviet 
Union, Turkey made its attitude towards this state smoother. On the other hand, the 
Arabs could not shake of the effect of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in a 
humiliating defeat for them. In his diary, Mahmut Dikerdem (1990:114), one of the 
outstanding Turkish diplomats who closely followed developments in the Middle 
East, emphasizes this reality in the following words:   
Salah Salim…who was known as the brilliant man of the Revolutionary 
Council, gave a lecture on the philosophy of the Egyptian Revolution. After 
the end of the lecture, he brought the matter of Israel into his speech. He said 
that the Israeli state was a dagger which was stabbed into the heart of the 
Arab world, and the Arabs would never consider any other threat as long as 
Israel exists, and they would not establish any friendship with the states that 
recognize Israel, and Turkey would not also gain the friendship of Egypt 
while relations between Israel and Turkey continue.     
   
For this reason, the Democrat government that wanted to develop good relations with 
the Arab world as well as keeping contacts with Israel, should structure its Middle 
East politics in a very sensitive way. 
 
 During the first half of the 1950s, the Turkish governments established good 
relations with Israel. Apart from realizing that the young Israeli state would not be a 
pro-Soviet state, technological and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel 
were important factors for ameliorating relations. In that period, Turkey looked upon 
Israel chiefly as a country, which had achieved rapid modernization and progress in a 
relatively underdeveloped area. (Karpat,1975:114) According to Nachmani 
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(1999:39), while trade and military cooperation between two countries had improved 
in this period, the Turkish and Israeli authorities continued military cooperation in 
secrecy due to fear of the Arab reaction against Turkey. In this context, while Arab 
nationalism developed as a reaction to the emergence of the Israeli state, the Turkish 
government considered the problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine from 
the perspective of its security concerns, which gave priority to the containment of the 
Soviet Union in collaboration with its western allies in the region. (Kürkçüoğlu, 
1972: 1-20)         
  
 The most decisive attitude of the Democrat governments against Israel came 
after the end of the Suez Canal crisis. Turkey withdrew its diplomatic representatives 
from Israel due to the reactions from the Arab world. 38 The foreign ministry touched 
on the matter of recalling the ambassador to Tel Aviv as follows:   
The Turkish government supported the endeavors to solve the Palestine 
Question within the decisions of the United Nations since the beginning, and 
put efforts both in and outside of the United Nations. 
The Turkish government, worried about the continuance of the unsolved 
Palestine matter, which constitutes to be an element of uneasiness and danger 
in the Near East, has decided to withdraw its ambassador in Tel Aviv until an 
eventual solution with peace and equity can be brought to the Palestine 
issue.39  
 
As Kürkçüoğlu (1972:99-100) states, the Turkish authorities preferred to emphasize 
the Arab-Israeli conflict without referring to the Egypt-Israeli conflict during the 
Suez Canal crisis. Indeed Turkey took this step in order to prevent any uneasiness 
among Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact.  Therefore, this can be regarded as a 
Turkish policy objective in order to protect the unity of this pact. In this context, 
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Turkey did not develop an original attitude on the Palestine question (Kut 1991:5) In 
fact; it considered the matter was related to other matters in the Middle East, to be 
handled within the context of its pro-western foreign policy objectives in the Middle 
East. 
 
5.2. The Suez Canal Crisis: 
 
The United States, Britain, France and Turkey wanted to draw Egypt into a 
pro-western defense alliance against the so-called international communist threat. 
However, it was obvious that the Egyptian government under the leadership of 
Nasser was uneasy with the increasing influence of the Western world in the Middle 
East after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. Besides this, Nasser followed 
balance politics between the west and communist world in order to strengthen his 
rule in Egypt.  Since the Western states would not approve the delivery of the huge 
amount of sophisticated weaponry to Egypt, Nasser began to found closer ties with 
the Soviets. (Love,1969:88) In September 1955, Nasser shocked the west and 
delighted the Arab masses by announcing an agreement to purchase large quantities 
of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia. (Mansfield, 1985:253) 
 
 In this respect, the relations between the Western world and Egypt began to 
enter a controversial era. The most important event that contributed to further 
deterioration in these relations was the issue of Aswan Dam Project and in its 
conclusion nationalization of the Suez Canal. Britain, the United States and World 
Bank promised to provide $ 270 million aid for the Egyptian ruling power to 
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undertake the project.40 However, the United States withdrew its promise for aid 
because of the Egyptians’ reluctant attitude towards the issue of the Middle East 
defense against any probable communist threat. The main events that drew the 
United States to give up its proposals were Egypt’s establishment of diplomatic 
relations with communist China in May 1956 and the decision to sell cotton to the 
Soviet Union. The World Bank and Britain followed the United States on the matter 
of providing credits to Nasser. As a response to this behavior, Nasser declared the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal region in order to cover the finances of the Aswan 
Dam project.41  
 
The Western powers regarded this decision as an act against the security of 
the canal and the freedom for passage. (Gönlübol&Ülman,1999:280) The French, 
British and American authorities, who met in London on 29th July 1956 decided to 
arrange a conference in London on 16th August 1956 in order to negotiate the dispute 
over the canal.42 It was decided to call the countries who became the parties to the 
1888 Istanbul Treaty who frequently used the canal.43 
 
While the Turkish government decided to send a delegate committee under 
the head of Muharrem Nuri Birgi, Egypt and Greece declared that they would not 
take part in London Conference.44 In this framework, from the point of the nationalist 
and anti-colonialist Arabs, the Turkish government seemed to side with the western 
powers against the Egyptian national interests.  
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During the negotiations in London, the United States Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, presented a proposal in order to determine the status of the Suez 
Canal. Within the framework of this plan, it was suggested that the Suez Canal 
continued to be a transnational waterway as in the provisions of the 1888 Istanbul 
Treaty. It is possible to point out the provisions of this plan that directly related to the 
interests of the Egyptian government under three main headings45 
• The Canal would be managed under an international organization, 
which would be supervised by the United Nations. A treaty would 
establish the organization that would manage the Canal. In this 
organization, Egypt would have its own representatives.    
• As in the provisions of Istanbul Treaty, all of the countries would use 
the Canal without any restriction.  
• Reasonable and fair revenue would be paid to the Egyptian 
government. 
 
The Turkish delegate under the head of the ambassador, Mr. Birgi, declared that 
Turkey would support the plan. In his speech to the conference, Mr. Birgi explained 
the Turkish view in the following words:  
We are a Muslim nation. For this and other reasons, we are the friends of the 
Arab countries and we like them. We support the struggles of the Arab 
countries for their own freedom and independence. One of our greatest 
wishes is that the Arab countries maintain their independence. However, we 
do not see that the honor and independence of Egypt is damaged because the 
Suez Canal is placed under a neutral international administration. In our 
opinion, the plan that was proposed by Dulles is supported by the principle of 
equity and fairness.46  
 
Whilst the Turkish declaration emphasized that Turkey would respect the sovereign 
rights of the Arabic countries within their territories, it indicated that the Turkish 
government would support the Dulles Plan, which proposed superficial changes in 
the status of the Suez Canal.  In other words, the plan was structured on behalf of the 
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protection of the western interests. Nasser could not accept this proposal. In this 
regard, the Egyptian government accused Turkey, along with other Muslim members 
of the Baghdad Pact, of collaborating with the imperialist western powers. 
 
 On the other hand, Turkey, Pakistan, India and Ethiopia proposed changes in 
the Dulles Plan. In this proposal, it was stated that Egypt’s sovereign rights would 
not be damaged under the new canal regulation and administration, and the 
requirement of the payment for the damages to the old company of the Suez Canal 
would not be expressed as a decision but a wish. Since the majority of the countries 
that joined this conference accepted this proposal, the Dulles Plan was modified and 
from then on it was called “five states’ plan.”47 (Gönlübol& Ülman: 281, 1999) 
Moreover, it was decided that a commission under the head of the Australian Prime 
Minister, Menzies, would suggest negotiations to Egypt in order to discuss the 
content of the plan.48 Such initiatives of the Turkish delegate can be regarded as 
efforts to find a middle and agreeable point between the Dulles Plan and Egyptian 
claims.49 
 
 The negotiations with the Egyptian authorities during the first week of 
September could not reach a solution and Nasser did not accept the  “five states’ 
plan.” (Gönlübol&Ülman,281:1999)  As a result of this, France and the United 
Kingdom began to take a tougher attitude towards the issue by considering the 
refusal of the Egyptians for the plan as very serious and stating that the United 
Kingdom and France concluded an agreement on the matter of measures that would 
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be taken against Egypt.50 Besides this, it was a fact that the United Kingdom and 
France began to engage in some military activities in the region. France declared that 
with the permission of the United Kingdom, some French troops had been landed in 
Cyprus in order to protect the life and property of the French citizens in the Suez 
Canal region.51  
 In this atmosphere, France and the United Kingdom demanded 
reconsideration of the issue. Therefore, the 17 states that supported the “five states’ 
plan” decided to resume negotiations in London.52 The Turkish government decided 
to send a delegation to London.53 Dulles presented a proposal for the establishment 
of a union of the countries that use the Suez Canal in order to make the Canal gain an 
international status. (Gönlübol&Ülman,1995:281) As a result, all of the countries 
that became parties to the conference except Japan and Ethiopia decided to establish 
this union. Turkey and Pakistan joined the union.54    
 On the other hand, since the United Kingdom and France could not make 
Egypt accept the proposals for solution to the Suez Canal crisis within the framework 
of the London negotiations, they applied to the United Nations Security Council by 
claiming that Egypt was engaged in actions that endangered international peace and 
security.55 However, the Security Council could not deliver a definite proposal for 
the restoration of peace in the region. While it decided that passing through the Canal 
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should be free without any political and technical restriction, it also emphasized 
respect for the sovereign rights of Egypt.56   
 Since all efforts for a peaceful resolution to the conflict either in the structure 
of the London Conferences or the UN Security Council could not produce a valuable 
progress the atmosphere in the region became more strained. Eventually, Israel 
launched an attack against Egypt on 28th October.57 The Israeli authorities tried to 
justify this act by emphasizing the increasing attempts of the commando attacks on 
the Israeli security forces.58 However, it was fact that since the Arab-Israeli war of 
1948, Egypt had not allowed the passing of the ships to Israel because of the fear of 
transporting weapons to Israel. (Bağcı,1990:266) Following the Israeli attack, the 
United Kingdom and France launched their troops in the Suez Canal region. Within a 
short period of time, the British and French forces destroyed the Egyptian forces. In 
their calculation, they hoped that Nasser could be toppled.  
(Gönlübol&Ülman,1995:283) The greatest reaction against the British and French 
attacks came from the Soviet Union. Nikita Kruchev, the Soviet President, threatened 
that the Soviet Union would launch missile attacks on London and Paris unless the 
United Kingdom and France ended their aggressive behavior, but the Americans 
urged Kruchev to show restraint.59     
 As a result of intensive international pressures, the United Kingdom and 
France declared that they would withdraw their troops from the region. Israel also 
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followed them. After that, the UN Peace Forces were deployed to the regions where 
the Israel-French-British troops evacuated.60 Hence, the British and French 
authorities could not achieve their policy objectives, which were based on toppling 
Nasser and restoring their powerful status in the Suez Canal region. Besides this, the 
Egyptian declaration for the new status of the Suez Canal on 24th April 1957 proved 
that Egypt had taken the administration of the Canal into its hands. According to this, 
the Suez Canal Office would carry out the administrative duties and determine the 
fines for passing through the Canal.61   
With regard to changes in the balance of power in the region, it can be stated 
that while the United Kingdom and France lost their superior position in the region, 
the Soviet Union with its severe attitude and threats against them increased its 
prestigious position in the eyes of the nationalist Arabs. (Strange,1957:96) On the 
other hand, since the United States and Turkey were allies of  Britain and France 
within the framework of NATO and the Baghdad Pact, they could not take really 
tough steps against them.  As an indicator of this situation, Turkey with other 
members of the Baghdad Pact condemned Israel for launching a sudden attack and 
demanded the withdrawal of the British and French troops.62 Iraq and Pakistan as the 
other Muslim countries of the Baghdad Pact demanded the exclusion of the United 
Kingdom from the Pact. (Bağcı,1990:80) However, Turkey argued strongly that 
Britain should not be expelled from the Pact, and persuaded other members to accept 
its view. (Ataöv,1970:134) Although Turkey demanded withdrawal of the British 
troops from the Canal region because of its fear that the uneasiness among other 
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Muslim members of the pact might lead to cleavages in the framework of the Pact, it 
emphasized the unconcilatory attitude of Nasser. The speech of Ethem Menderes, 
who became the Foreign Minister towards the end of the crisis, reveals this reality as 
follows:  
When today’s rulers of Egypt brought the issue of the Suez Canal into agenda 
with the help of some neutralists and communist propaganda, they found the 
opportunity to show themselves as heroes of eastern world, and indicate the 
issue as an independence war that concerned all of the Asian and African 
countries and as a struggle between west and east. As they created such an 
atmosphere, they would prevent criticisms against the Egyptian rulers. 
According to them, if someone expressed that Egyptian attitude and behavior 
on this issue was not right, this would mean that they react against the honor 
and independence of the Arabic and Islamic world, and whole east. 63   
During the London Conference, another matter that affected the attitude of 
the Turkish government was the comparison of the status of the Turkish Straits with 
the Canal. Turkey succeeded in taking the Straits under its control by the Montreux 
Convention and became uncomfortable with the Soviet demands for the alteration of 
the status of the Straits during the aftermath of the Second World War. On the other 
hand, at the London Conference, the Turkish government declared its support for the 
Dulles Plan that stressed the international character of the Canal. This situation led 
the Turkish authorities into a dilemma. Nasser saw a similarity between the Turkish 
Straits and the Suez Canal problem and wanted Turkey to mediate in July 1956. 
(Kürkçüoğlu,1972:93) However, according to the Turkish elite, there could not be 
established a similarity with regard to status of the Canal and Straits. The statement 
of Çoşar constitutes a good example for such attitude in the following words:  
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The Straits question was solved without considering Turkish rights during the 
Lausanne conference. A Straits commission was set up and territories around 
the Straits became a non-military zone. Despite all this, Turkey remained 
faithful to the agreement in Lausanne, and achieved the abolishment of this 
agreement not by itself but through the participation of all countries that were 
concerned with the matter. Hence it got a new agreement that preserved its 
rights. It achieved this by inculcating an atmosphere of confidence to all 
nations.64 
On the other hand, the words on the issue of having confidence between parties 
remain a controversial issue, because there did not exist an environment for 
confidence between Egypt and the west. If the relations between them leading up to 
the Canal crisis are considered within the framework of western initiatives  to cancel 
financial aid for the Aswan Dam project in order to force Egypt into a defence pact, 
it can be seen that not Egypt but the west caused  the  atmosphere of trust to 
evaporate.           
In addition to this, Turkey refrained from emphasizing the legal side of the 
matter. It considered the Suez Canal problem as a struggle between powers that 
would introduce communism into the Middle East and the ‘free world’. The speech 
of Muharrem Nuri Birgi, who headed the Turkish delegate, reveals this matter in the 
following words: “The statements that the majority of the countries made during 
London Conference and the result of this conference disproved the claims that try to 
reflect the London Conference as an attempt to assault the honor and independence 
of Egypt and also the whole Arab world.” 65 
Following the First London Conference, Turkey continued to support western 
claims and proposals for a solution to the problem during the second one. Therefore, 
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this kind of attitude caused the Arabs to see Turkey as a country in the Middle East, 
which collaborated with the western countries. As an indicator of this situation, while 
Nasser refused the establishment of the Union for the countries that use the Canal, he 
condemned Turkey for being a guardian of western imperialism not only in the 
Arabic world but also the non-allied movement.(Bağcı,1990:80) In this framework, 
the Turkish attitude led to a further deterioration in the relations between Turkey and 
the Arab world. In other words, the Suez imbroglio posed a serious challenge to 
Turkey’s western alliance. (Karpat, 1975:55)        
 
 5.3 Strained Relations with Syria 
 
The political situation during the initial period of the Turkish-Syrian relations 
did not create a positive atmosphere for the development of these relations. Although 
Turkey was reluctant to see Syria as an independent state, it recognized Syria’s full 
independent status in 1946. The main reason behind the unfriendly relations between 
Turkey and Syria was the incorporation of Hatay (Alexandretta) into the Turkish 
state. Soysal (1999:101) describes the position of both sides as follows: 
The Turkish government was willing to recognize Syria on the condition that 
it accepted the Hatay as a province of Turkey. The Turkish minister of 
foreign affairs, Hasan Saka mentioned this to his counterpart Jamal Mardam, 
during his visit to Damascus. But Mr. Saka soon realized that the Syrian 
government would not accept this condition. As a result, Turkey did not 
assign an ambassador to Damascus, but only a consul general. In any case, 
Syrians refused to recognize Hatay as a Turkish province and thus Turkey’s 
insistence on this condition was unnecessary. Turkey, considering its legal 
point of view, as well as its strong position vis-à-vis Syria, recognized it in 
1946. 
 
 
After the recognition and establishment of diplomatic missions between two 
countries, the relations could not be structured on healthy and sound ground because 
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of the Hatay issue. However, while the Syrians were uneasy over the incorporation of 
Hatay into Turkey, its leaders were willing to improve relations with Turkey without 
extending any official reservation on the position of Hatay. (Soysal,1999:101) On the 
other hand, since the new regime in Syria did not have a strong popular base in the 
country, there occurred several instances of military takeovers in 1949.66 Therefore, 
any Syrian ruling power needed to strengthen its popularity among the Syrian people 
in order to keep itself in office. For example, in order to increase his popularity, Adib 
Shishakli67 revived the Hatay question and claimed ownership of Hatay and 
published new maps of Syria including Hatay and Turkish Taurus area in Syrian 
territory. (Soysal 102, 1999) In this framework, the Hatay issue constituted one of 
the main propaganda tools for the Syrian rulers. Soysal (1999:78), who also served as 
a Turkish diplomatic representative in Syria emphasizes this reality in his diary in the 
following words: 
When Shishakli invited me to his office he asked the reason why Turkey had 
withdrawn its ambassador and said “the Hatay issue is brought up for the sake 
of maintaining internal consumption,” and added that “if any Syrian leader 
neglects this matter, he cannot possibly rest on his chair.” He also said 
“Turkey’s military power is ten fold superior compared to Syria” and added 
“how can we dare to declare war against Turkey.” The President seemed to 
be quite sincere in his confession.              
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However, whether for internal consumption or not, the Hatay issue remained a big 
issue for the Syrians. According to them, when France gave Hatay to Turkey in 
return for support during the Second World War it was acting in breach of the 
League of Nation mandate.68  
As a result of the speeches and movements of Syrian leaders on the Hatay 
issue against Turkey, the Turkish authorities reacted against Syria. President Celal 
Bayar insisted on withdrawing the Turkish ambassador in 1953. (Soysal,1999:102) 
The strained relations with Syria continued during the Democrat era. Moreover, 
strengthening anti-colonialist and national tendencies in Syria made the west and 
Turkey worry about the future of Syria. Following Egypt’s example, the Syrian 
government established good relations with the Soviets and recognized China. 
(Gönlübol&Ülman,1995:290) Therefore, apart from the Hatay issue, the Syrian 
attitude towards the western plans to build an alliance structure with Turkey in the 
region contributed another dimension to the problematic relations between Syria and 
Turkey during the Democrat rule.          
The Syrian government’s pro-Soviet attitude and delivery of Soviet-made 
weaponry caused an increase in the security concerns of Turkey and the members of 
the Baghdad Pact. (Bağcı,1990:89) Russia delivered a note, which blamed Turkey 
for engaging in military maneuvers across the Syrian border and threatened that it 
would take necessary steps against this.69 As a response to this note, Menderes stated 
that if the Soviet Union desired to establish a sincere friendship with Turkey, it 
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should end the policy that it followed in the Middle East, especially in Syria.70  
Following this, while Syria complained about Turkey to the United Nations by 
claiming that the Turks were building up military forces along the Syrian border, 
Kruchev said that in case of war against Syria, ‘we are near to Turkey but the 
Americans are not.  Turkey would not stand even one day if there were war’. He also 
said that the Soviets were prepared to use military power in order to protect its 
interests in the region. 71  
On the other hand, the United States declared that despite the physical 
distance between Turkey and the United States, it would help Turkey against any 
communist attack in the framework of NATO and the Eisenhower doctrine, which 
promised military and technical aid to countries that were regarded as lying under the 
communist threat.72 This indicated that the American authorities expressed their 
guarantee for the defense of Turkey and acting with solidarity in case of war.    
The Turkish and Syrian authorities did not take any initiative to calm down 
the crisis along the border. As a response to the Syrian note that condemned Turkey 
for provocation on the border, the Turkish government refused such Syrian claims 
and defended itself by saying that the military movements along the border were only 
defensive steps.73 Moreover, during the meeting of NATO, Menderes called its allies 
to take measures against Syria because of its emergence as a new communist threat.74 
Following this incident, both Turkey and Syria caused a deepening of the crisis by 
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sending strongly worded  notes to each other. While Syria refused Turkish claims, 
the Turkish authorities insisted that Syria was becoming the center of spreading 
communist tendencies, which threatened so called community of free nations.75         
However, the declaration for the establishment of a political union between 
Syria and Egypt on February 22nd 1958 eased the strained Turkish-Syrian relations. 
Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Turkish foreign minister, expressed the Turkish attitude 
towards this unification in the following words: 
It is said that a federation will be set up between Syria and Egypt. Closer 
relations among all of the countries in the Middle East do not irritate us. 
Moreover, if such a federation protects the countries that founded this, and 
take Syria out of the Soviet orbit, we will be happy. What we do not like is 
that any of our neighbors, become the means of spreading international 
communism. (Gönlübol &Ülman, 1996:279) 
As a result, Turkey officially recognized the United Arab Republic that was 
established with the unification of Syria and Egypt in 1958.76  
 The attitude of the Democrat government during the conflict on the Turkish-
Syrian border indicates similarities with the Suez Canal crisis. Turkey considered the 
matter as a struggle between powers that desired to bring communism into the region 
and the free world. The speech of Adnan Menderes in the Turkish assembly 
constituted a good indicator of this situation: 
The events in the Middle East are composed of not the matters between two 
countries, such as a problem between Syria and Turkey, but the great fights 
between two blocks that are concentrated in the Middle East… A state, which 
is outside of the region is attempting to found military bases that endanger 
security and stability of the Middle East, and seems to be successful in this, 
worrying not only the countries of the Middle East but also the other 
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countries that acted for the protection of the world peace. In this 
circumstance, Turkey is quite awake. (Öztürk, 1988:456-458)             
In this statement, Turkey expressed its uneasiness about strengthening Soviet 
existence in the Middle East.  However, it disregarded the fact that western countries 
had military bases in the Middle East, including Turkey.77  In this framework, while 
Turkey cooperated with the western countries and supported their initiatives in the 
region, Turkish complaints about Syria’s founding contacts with the USSR were not 
realistic.  
The unstable political life and anti-colonialist and nationalist tendencies in 
Syria caused Turkey to worry about the formation of a communist regime on its 
border. During the crisis with Syria, the main claim of the Turkish government was 
focused on the fear that Turkey would be surrounded by the Soviet Union on its 
northeastern border, and a new communist Syria on its southern border. As 
Kürkçüoğlu (1972:122) states, the Turkish authorities considered military maneuvers 
in the border region as being defensive.  He argues however that before engaging in 
such military moves, the Turkish authorities could have taken other steps by opting 
for peaceful negotiations within the framework of the United Nations. 
 5.4. The Military Takeover in Iraq 
Following the conflict with Syria, the most important event that led to 
deterioration in the Turkish political status in the region was the military takeover in 
Iraq. On July 14th 1958, the Iraqi monarchy and government were overthrown.78  
Whilst it was a fact that the nationalist and anti-colonial elements dominated the 
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course of the takeover, the leaders of this movement expressed their willingness to 
continue good relations with the west. A few days after the coup and the 
establishment of the new government, the Prime Minister, General Abdulkarim 
Kassem, stated that the coup was not against the west and Iraq would continue to 
cooperate with the western world in accordance with bilateral interests. 
(Gönlübol&Ülman,1996:301) 
On the other hand, the Turkish government was not pleased with such 
statements of the new Iraqi administration and held a negative attitude towards it. 
The most competent authorities of the Turkish government expressed their 
unwillingness to recognize the new regime. The statement of Fuat Köprülü 
(Kürkçüoğlu,1972:133) indicates this reality as follows: “According to us, a new 
regime in Iraq cannot be a subject.  The head of the Iraqi-Jordan Federation is King 
Hussein and its legitimate government is the one that is under the rule of King 
Hussein.” After the meeting of the Baghdad Pact members in Ankara, the Turkish 
government declared that it would approve mobilization for precautionary situations 
and males between the ages of 22 and 45 might be called up for the military 
service.79 Such initiatives for a probable military movement might lead statesmen to 
think that Turkey would intervene in Iraq in order to restore the old monarchic 
regime by overthrowing the existing military one. Indicating its concern, the Soviet 
Union issued a note that accused Turkey of preparing for an attack on Iraq.80 On the 
other hand, in the counter-note, the Turkish government declared that it would never 
                                                                                                                                          
78 Cumhuriyet on July 15th 1958 
79 Cumhuriyet on July 22nd 1958 
80 Cumhuriyet on July 20th 1958 
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undertake movements that increased tension in the Middle East.81 This statement of 
the Turkish government can be evaluated as a guarantee to the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, for the first time in Turkish political history, an opposition 
party had criticized the ruling power over for its foreign policy objectives. Up till that 
time both the opposition and party in power had considered foreign policy as a 
serious matter that should remain above the rivalry between the parties. (Gök, 1984: 
58) In a press meeting, İsmet İnönü, as the leader of the opposition, accused the 
Democrats of endangering the security of Turkey by becoming involved in the 
domestic affairs of Iraq, and stated that because of these policies, the defense of 
Turkish territory might be impossible by the Turks in the case of any obligation to 
protect and defend their motherland.82   
However, whilst Turkey stated that it considered the union between Iraq and 
Jordan as a unique legitimate political structure, the union between Iraq and Jordan 
seemed to be a marriage that had been realized by the force of the western powers. 
Consequently, King Hussein said that the Arab Federal Union between Iraq and 
Jordan had come to an end.83 Eventually, the Turkish government was obliged to 
accept the reality that emerged in Iraq. Turkey recognized the new regime in Iraq on 
July 31st 1958.84  
The military coup in Iraq, as the last chain of the most important happenings 
in the Middle East in the 1950s, indicated that the active politics towards the Middle 
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83 Keessing’s, 1957-1958: 160307 
84 Zafer on August 1st 1958 
 70 
East region delivered by the Democrats had collapsed. In this regard, the open 
support of the Democrat government for the Iraqi monarchical rule, which was 
founded under the auspices of British imperialism, led Turkey to be a party to the 
conflict between the anti-colonialist nationalist and monarchical powers in the Arab 
world. Therefore, in the case of the struggle between the monarchy and nationalist 
Arabs in Iraq, Turkey intervened in intra-Arab matters on behalf of the western 
world, which considered the permanence of the traditional regimes in the Middle 
East as being necessary for their interests. Therefore, such an attitude of the Turkish 
government during this crisis led to the strengthening of anti-western and anti-
Turkish views in the Arab world.(Kürkçüoğlu,1972:136) As a result, the Turkish 
government continued to lose prestige in the eyes of the nationalist Arabs who were 
the coming power in the Middle East.     
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 It is clear that Turkish foreign policy followed a very different path after the 
end of the Second World War. In this context, Turkey was prepared to play a leading 
role in order to bring the Arabs in an alliance against the so-called communist threat. 
The new Turkish government, formed by the Democrats after the multi-party 
election in 1950, signaled that a new era would begin between the Turks and Arabs.  
The Democrats hoped that establishing political and military ties with the Arabs 
under the protection of the western powers would end alienation between the Turks 
and Arabs. However, contrary to their expectations, the more Turkey dealt with the 
Middle East affairs on behalf of the western powers, the more relations with the 
Arabs deteriorated. While anti-western and nationalist tendencies were strengthening 
in the Arab world, Turkey took an aggressive attitude towards the Arabs in order to 
make them to join the pact against the so-called strengthening communist threat.  
 
 Indeed, because of the western factor in their policy objectives, it is not 
surprising that the Democrat governments could not achieve rapprochement with the 
Arab world. In other words, whilst the conceptualization of westernization was 
changed after the transition to a  multi-party democracy, the adherence to 
westernization continued to be a dominant factor in Democrat policies. In this 
context, the following conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of Democrat 
attitudes to westernization and relations with the Arabs:  
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 In the first place, Turkish politicians kept foreign policy matters outside  
political discussions. During their opposition years, the Republicans were sparing in 
their criticism of Turkey’s policies on the Middle East. The most serious criticism 
came after the military takeover in Iraq.   In addition to this, popular support for the 
Democrats derived from the relaxation of secular measures and  not from the  
amelioration of relations with the Arab world.  In other words, popular support did 
not play a determinant factor in governmental policies in the Middle East. Economic 
development and relaxation of secularism constituted two of the most important 
considerations of this popular support. As a result, contrary to the period between 
1923 and 1945, the Democrats ignored the social and cultural measures of 
westernization.  While the Republicans considered these reforms as a means of 
creating a unique Turkish identity in accordance with western standards of 
civilisation and excluding the Arab influence in Turkish social life, the Democrats 
abandoned them on the ground that they were contrary to freedom of belief.  
 
Whether voter support in the next elections or freedom of belief led them to 
relax secular measures,  such relaxation was not influenced by the desire for  
rapprochement with the Arab world. On the contrary, after inclusion in NATO, the  
Democrats began to engage in military alliances in the region with support of the 
United States and Britain. As a result, western factor continued to be dominant factor 
in Turkish policy objectives. 
 Secondly, although it is argued that Turkish foreign policy took  a very 
different path after 1950,  differences were not in the mentality that saw 
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westernization as ultimate goal, but in structure. The  Western factor influenced the 
neutrality of  Turkish foreign policy objectives in social and political terms before 
1950.  That is, Turkey wanted to realize social westernization without engaging in 
political issues of the Arab territories that were under British and French 
protectorate. From the point of politics, strengthening German influence in the 
Middle East worried Britain and France. They wanted to preserve the status quo 
through an agreement with Turkey. The Saadabad Pact, which considered non-
recognition of any border change in the Middle East, was the product of their efforts 
to maintain the  status quo. In this context, Turkey’s non-interference in the Middle 
East during the republican era indicates a  parallelism with Britain and France’s 
status quo mentality. However, after 1950, the  strengthening communist threat and 
the division of the world into bipolar structure led western powers to be more 
dominant in the Middle East. In order to keep the Arabs under their control, they 
emphasized the  necessity of alliances in the region. At this point, Turkey played a 
significant role in western efforts to establish pacts with the Arab countries. 
Therefore, parallel to transformation in western consideration from status quo 
mentality to efforts to expand alliance networks, Turkey began to play a more active 
role in the region. In this framework, changes in Turkish foreign policy objectives 
were realized in accordance with changes in western considerations in the region. 
Therefore, the western factor was clearly a major factor during both the Republican 
and Democrat eras.  
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